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THESIS

THE RETURN OF THE "GOOD NEIGHBOR":
A POLICY FOR ACHIEVING U.S. OBJECTIVES
IN LATIN AMERICA THROUGH THE NINTIES
AND BEYOND?

by

Richard Leon Jordan

December 1991

Thesis Advisor

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**The Return of the "Good Neighbor":
A Policy For Achieving U.S. Objectives in
Latin America through the Nineties and Beyond?**

by

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It is determined that broad similarities do exist in terms of U.S. policy objectives. Specific differences are also identified and the Good Neighbor policy principles are re-interpreted to account for these differences.

Five options for U.S. policy towards Latin America are discussed. The thesis concludes that a policy of cooperative multi-lateralism, based on revised Good Neighbor principles, is the most effective policy for achieving U.S. objectives in Latin America.

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I. INTRODUCTION

From the mid 1930s until the adoption of containment as the guiding principle of U.S. security strategy in the late 1940s, the "Good Neighbor Policy" fostered an unprecedented atmosphere of inter-American cooperation. Many Latin American and North American scholars cite this period in U.S.-Latin American relations as an era of positive interaction in an otherwise unproductive relationship.

Carlos Fuentes calls President Franklin Roosevelt's (FDR) policies a "legacy of mutual and pragmatic respect."¹ Michael Kryzanek credits implementation of the Good Neighbor policy with promoting substantial improvements in U.S.-Latin American relations through wartime cooperation, expanded trade, and post-World War II defense cooperation.² Richard Bloomfield believes the time is right to develop U.S.- Latin American collective security strategies similar to those of the Good Neighbor policy.³

¹ Carlos Fuentes, Latin America: At War with the Past (Toronto, Canada: CBC Enterprises, 1985), 55-6.

² Michael J. Kryzanek, U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 52-3.

³ Richard Bloomfield, "Suppressing the Interventionist Impulse", in Richard Bloomfield and Gregory Trevorton, ed., Alternative to Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 93-136.

Others have advocated policies that mirror the principles of the Good Neighbor policy even though they do not explicitly link their recommendations to it. Abraham Lowenthal calls for a U.S. policy built on "confidence and trust" (confianza) with the United States and Latin America confronting shared problems as partners.⁴ Robert A. Pastor discusses the opportunity to cement a "hemispheric bargain" based on compromise and respect for both U.S. and Latin American sovereignty.⁵ George A. Fauriol contends we are in a period of "unique historical context" in the Western Hemisphere and the challenge is to "foster an affirmation of hemispheric consensus and encourage countries to work toward an often vaguely expressed partnership".⁶ This partnership would require a new mind set which Fauriol calls "hemispheric regionalism". Over time, he asserts, this could lead to a "re-conceptualization of U.S. hemispheric thinking".⁷

⁴ Abraham Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987).

⁵ Robert A. Pastor, "Forging A Hemispheric Bargain: The Bush Opportunity", in Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 43, No.1 (Summer/Fall, 1989), 69-81.

⁶ Georges A. Fauriol, "The Third Century: U.S. Latin American Policy Choices for the 1990s", CSIS Significant Issues Series Vol.X, No.13 (undated): xiii.

⁷ Ibid., 17.

The main question this thesis addresses is the following: *Could a rejuvenated version of the Good Neighbor policy be an effective policy base for achieving U.S. objectives in Latin America today and in the future?* Related questions include: What are the similarities and differences between the forces shaping today's world and the forces that gave birth to the Good Neighbor policy? What are the basic principles of the Good Neighbor policy? Would such a regional strategy be congruous with overall U.S. national strategy? How would such a policy deal with the apparently complex issues of inter-American concern? Are there other regional policy options for the United States to pursue?

In order to answer these questions, Chapter II will attempt to identify the forces at work in the 1930s and 1940s that led to the adoption of the Good Neighbor policy by FDR and his administration. The fundamental principles of Good Neighbor diplomacy will also be defined and correlated with U.S. policy objectives during this era.

Chapter III will compare the forces that shaped the world from World War I through World War II with today's international environment. U.S. national security objectives as stated in the President's National Security

Strategy of the United States⁸ will be placed in a regional perspective in order to identify those issues with relevance to Latin America.

In Chapter IV, Good Neighbor issues and objectives will be compared and contrasted with U.S. objectives in Latin America today in an attempt to identify any similarities or differences. Additionally, Good Neighbor principles will be revised to try to determine whether or not they have any application to present and future U.S. regional interests.

Chapter V will discuss five policy options that the United States might use as the foundation for pursuing U.S. interests in Latin America. In conclusion, it will recommend the best path to pursue.

⁸ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (August, 1991).

II. THE ORIGINS OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

An understanding of the international and U.S. domestic environment that shaped the Good Neighbor policy is important to determining its true objectives. This will help place Good Neighbor policy in its proper perspective and help in a determination of whether or not the policy was successful.

A. 1907-1945: A WORLD IN SEARCH OF BALANCE

The rise of Anglo-German antagonism at the turn of the century, and the perceived threat this posed to Britain, transformed the existing "Balance of Power" system in 1907. This system had guided the actions of European powers for almost a century. British fears were lodged in the belief that Great Britain's own resources were no longer adequate to maintain the security of its empire against a growing German threat.

This fear led to the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. Examining these agreements, and the alliances Germany had forged with Austria and Italy, reveals that by 1907 a bi-polar system had emerged between the two power camps. This system was characterized by accelerating arms programs and the fear of

losing allies to the opposite camp. The lack of inter-penetration between these camps and the inability of Britain and Germany to control their junior partners made this an unstable system that exploded in 1914.⁹

After World War I, the failure of the victors to build an effective international system led to over three decades of instability and turmoil. The Balance of Power system had been destroyed and the establishment of a new order between 1919 and 1939 became an impossible task for a number of reasons. First, the number of nation-states with global interests would grow steadily after World War I. Second, British and French interests were often divergent, making the process even more difficult. Third, the United States emerged as a world power during the war but would withdraw into isolationism in 1919 and abandon the leadership role it had assumed. Fourth, political passion and divergent ideologies were the order of the day. Communism was on the rise in Russia while national socialism was taking root in Germany. Additionally, nationalist sentiment in Japan was a major force helping to shape world events.

In the United States, emotional and mental isolation from the problems in Europe and Asia permeated American politics.

⁹ Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Times, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1990), 40-3.

America's self-image and foreign policy were rooted in isolationism nurtured by the geographic separation of the United States from Europe's problems.¹⁰ The United States was still consciously seeking to rid itself of its European heritage and detach itself from the problems of the rest of the world.¹¹

This was the domestic environment that FDR faced as President through the 1930s. Though not an isolationist, he too had a desire to keep the United States from becoming directly involved in European wars. However, he recognized the nature of the forces at work in the world and came to

¹⁰ Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1988), 170-4.

¹¹ George Washington set the stage for American foreign policy that essentially remained unchanged until World War II. In his farewell address he stated "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.... Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.....Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by intertwining our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humour, or caprice"? Ralph K. Andrist, ed., "George Washington: A Biography in His Own Words", as quoted by Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1988), 171.

the realization that the survival of the United States was linked to the outcome of events unfolding on the world stage. FDR would eventually link the survival of the United States to the survival of Britain and the destruction of the German war machine.¹²

B. WHAT WAS THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY?

The Good Neighbor policy was part of FDR's strategy for preventing Germany from establishing a strong-hold in Latin America. It represented a pragmatic approach towards achieving regional stability in a generally unstable world. It evolved from policy initiatives outlined during the Hoover administration, FDR's own life experiences, and the

¹² A speech given by Roosevelt on August 14, 1936 at Chautauqua, New York indicates his thinking on U.S. involvement in the war. He states "...we are not isolationists except insofar as we seek to isolate ourselves from war. Yet we must remember that so long as war exists on earth there will be some danger even to the nation that most ardently desires peace, danger that it also may be drawn into war.....I have passed unnumbered hours and I shall pass unnumbered hours thinking and planning how war may be kept from the United States of America...." Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol.III (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1969), 378. For a more thorough analysis of FDR's war policies see Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1985).

influence exerted by a handful of his close advisors.¹³

FDR did not always subscribe to such a cooperative doctrine. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy during Woodrow Wilson's presidency, he asserted that U.S. assurances of stability in the Americas were essential for trade and commerce, particularly in the Caribbean region. He commended Wilson for landing marines at Vera Cruz in 1914 and supported intervention in Haiti in 1915. Reacting to what he perceived as German encroachment in the Caribbean in 1917, FDR promoted the idea of the United States restoring order where necessary and maintaining U.S. military presence in the region.¹⁴

However, FDR's views changed considerably in the 1920s. In a 1928 article entitled "Our Foreign Policy" published in Foreign Affairs, he interpreted the self-defense principle of the Monroe Doctrine as a cooperative effort. He concluded that whenever U.S. military force is used in Latin America, it should be in conjunction with other Latin

¹³ President Hoover never defined his Latin American policy as clearly as F. Roosevelt would, but he reversed the interventionist tendencies of previous presidents and repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Pope Atkins, Latin America in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 120.

¹⁴ Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Policy: United States Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945 (Baltimore MD: The John Hopkins University Press), 10-1.

American nations.¹⁵ What caused this change in perspective? For one, his personal fight against polio had a transforming effect on FDR's basic character.¹⁶ Another factor was his association in the early 1920s with the Sumner Welles, a man FDR would pick as his Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.

Welles had the same educational background as FDR and they moved within the same social circles. As a result, they had common friends and acquaintances. Eleanor Roosevelt's mother and Welles' mother were close friends. Welles' and Eleanor Roosevelt's brother were classmates at Harvard.¹⁷ The social connection is important in that it provided opportunities for Welles and Roosevelt to discuss Latin American issues in an informal atmosphere.

¹⁵ Ibid., 11.

¹⁶ Though he never won the physical battle, FDR triumphed in the mental war against polio. A new FDR emerged. He became more patient, mature, and reflective. His experience with polio was the first time in his life that he personally felt the pain of suffering. Additionally, FDR developed a more critical sense of timing in his approach to both domestic and foreign policy. For a more in depth study of FDR's personality see Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1985).

¹⁷ Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America, 1933-1945 (Baltimore MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1979), 13.

Welles had been directly involved in Latin America as the head of several presidential missions to the Caribbean to defuse volatile situations. This increased his stature as an expert in U.S. - Latin American relations. Though he left public service in 1925, he remained a student and scholar of Latin American affairs in private life. It is interesting to note that in 1927, one year before Roosevelt's Foreign Affairs article, Welles wrote a history of the Dominican Republic entitled Naboth's Vineyard. In this book, he praised Secretary of State Hughs for interpreting the Monroe Doctrine as a defensive rather than offensive doctrine.¹⁸

When compared to Welles' belief that U.S. military force should be used only after consulting other American nations, and his ideas of hemispheric political and economic cooperation, his influence on FDR's Latin American policies appear significant.¹⁹ This influence is even more apparent

¹⁸ Ibid., 14.

¹⁹ One quote from Naboth's Vineyard is evidence that Welles' ideas may have influenced FDR's vision of the "wholly new attitude" towards Latin America. In summing up his ideas on what U.S. policy towards the region should be in the future, Welles states that "... in the Western Hemisphere lies its [U.S.] strength and support. In the identification of its interest both political and material, on a basis of absolute equality, with the interests of its sister republics of the continent, and in the rapid removal of the grounds for their

in a letter to FDR prior to his inauguration in 1933. In this letter, Welles explicitly outlined his views on hemispheric solidarity to the new president. The following is a summary of the principles he espoused:

- The creation and maintenance of cordial and intimate relations between the U.S. and other American Republics.
- The principle of continental self-defense and the adoption of this principle by all American Republics.
- The principle of consultation between American Republics when the peace and well being of the American world is in question.
- The acceptance of Pan-American responsibilities by all republics on equal terms, and the development of a mechanism for carrying out that obligation.
- The abolition of all barriers and restrictions to trade between nations of the Americas.²⁰

In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, FDR generalized the broad concept of what would become the Good Neighbor policy.²¹ In an address before the pan-American

distrust, lies its [U.S.] real advantage". Ibid.

²⁰ The principles are not explicitly listed in Welles' letter to Roosevelt. The list represents an interpretation of his views extracted from the text of the letter as published in Edgar B. Nixon, ed., "Draft by Sumner Welles of a statement on Pan-American Policy", Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol.I (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), 18-9.

²¹ Roosevelt's brief but often quoted passage from the inaugural address reads "....In the field of world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the Good Neighbor-the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he

Union approximately one month later, he restated in his own words most of the principles forwarded by Welles. These principles would come to form the basis of Good Neighbor diplomacy.²²

does so, respects the rights of others-the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors. We now realize as we have never realized before our interdependence on each other; that we cannot merely take, but must give as well..." James W. Gantenbein, ed., "Inaugural address by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 4, 1933 (extract)", The Evolution of Our Latin-American Policy: A Documentary Record (New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1971), 159.

²² The following are selected extracts from Roosevelt's address to the Pan American Union: (1) On cooperation and responsibility, "....Friendship among nations, as among individuals, calls for constructive effortsmutual obligations and responsibilities".....a sympathetic appreciation of the other's point of view", (2) On the Monroe Doctrine, " it was directed at the maintenance of the independence by the people of the continent".. and it is referred to as "...this Pan American doctrine of continental self-defense", (3) On equality, " Your Americanism and mine must be.....cemented by a sympathy which recognizes only fraternity and equality", (4) On trade, "....the American governments individually (should)....take action as may be possible to abolish all unnecessary and artificial barriers to trade." James W. Gantenbein, ed., "Address by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Delivered before the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, at Washington, April 12, 1933", The Evolution of Our Latin American Policy: A Documentary Record (New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1969), 159.

C. THE GOALS OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

FDR was gravely concerned over the prospects for global instability as a consequence of war.²³ Irwin F. Gellman states that "Roosevelt alone saw the totality of domestic and foreign interaction. From that vantage point, he realized his Latin American opportunity" and that Latin America would play "an integral part in shaping worldwide strategy".²⁴

FDR viewed the war in Europe as a direct threat to the security of the United States and moved to neutralize the influence of Germany in the Western Hemisphere. Latin American nations were among the leading exporters of all but two of the ten most important strategic raw materials of the time. This made it important to deny Germany access to

²³ Some of the most profound statements made by Roosevelt on his concerns over stability are those made in a speech at the San Diego Exposition in 1935. He states ".....the greatest writer in our history described the two most menacing clouds that hang over human government and human society as 'malice domestic and foreign war.'.....Never was there more genuine reason for Americans to face down these two causes of fear." Edgar B. Nixon, ed., "Speech by Roosevelt at the San Diego Exposition, San Diego, California, Oct. 2, 1935", Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, Vol.III (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), 12-3.

²⁴ Ibid.

these resources.²⁵ Latin America also accounted for virtually 100 percent of U.S. oil imports and U.S. oil companies were heavily involved throughout the hemisphere.²⁶ Additionally, the Panama Canal and the Caribbean basin were vital sea lines of communication for both trade and the Allied war effort.

FDR knew Germany had territorial designs on Latin America. Germany's desire was based partly on the general principle of territorial expansion inherent in German national socialist philosophy. But the primary motivation was Latin America's significance as a source of raw materials for Germany's economic growth.²⁷ FDR understood the severe consequences for the Allied war effort if Germany

²⁵ The ten raw materials were chromate, copper, lead, manganese, petroleum, tin, zinc, iron ore, coal, and nickel. The last two were not exported by Latin America. Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America

(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 158.

²⁶ Ibid., 155.

²⁷ In an journal article for *Foreign Affairs* written in 1937 entitled "Germany's Colonial Demands", a well known German economist Hjalmar Schacht wrote.. "Germany must produce her raw materials on territory under her own management". Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 157.

gained a strong foothold in the region.²⁸ His administration made a conscious and deliberate effort to counter German influence in South America and keep it from spreading elsewhere in hemisphere.

Towards this end, the primary objective of FDR's strategy appears to have been a commitment from Latin countries to anti-Axis security policies through cooperative security arrangements. The first, second, third, and fourth principles of the Good Neighbor policy relate directly to this effort.

FDR's efforts paid off with the adoption of the Act of Havana in 1940 when Latin countries committed themselves to protect the territorial possessions of non-American States threatened by force. Later, at the Rio Conference in 1942, Latin countries agreed to sever commercial ties with the Axis powers and committed themselves to a war effort in support of the Allies. The Rio Conference also established the Inter-American Defense Board for hemispheric defense cooperation and resulted in many bilateral defense

²⁸ In a memorandum of conversation dated April 11, 1939, between Secretary of State Hull and the Bolivian Minister to the United States, Hull speaks to the need for the United States to contain "lawless nations, hungry as wolves for the vast territory with rich undeveloped natural resources such as South America possesses". Ibid., 157.

agreements between the U.S. and Latin countries.²⁹

Growing nationalism was a primary force in Latin America that threatened attainment of this objective. This force exacerbated the issues of national sovereignty and economic fairness which were major issues involved in the expropriation of U.S. oil company property in Bolivia (1937) and Mexico (1948). In the Mexican case, the oil companies and their supporters appealed to FDR for U.S. military intervention.³⁰ However, the administration held to its commitments of hemispheric solidarity and legal settlements in both these cases were reached.³¹ If FDR had intervened militarily on behalf of U.S. oil interests, it is doubtful the U.S. would have retained its credibility in the region or achieved regional cooperation in the war effort. Neutralizing nationalist sentiment in Latin America appears to have been another goal of FDR's strategy to draw the United States and Latin America closer together. This objective correlates to the first principle of the Good

²⁹ Ibid., 54-5.

³⁰ The most significant case of expropriation was the Mexican Government's seizure of U.S. oil company properties in 1938. Michael Kryzanek, U.S.-Latin American Relations (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 53.

³¹ Irwin F. Gellman, Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin America 1933-1945 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), 56.

Neighbor policy. Striving for this goal helped counter German influence in South America. As a consequence, the second principle of the Good Neighbor policy was also served.

From the beginning, non-intervention was a useful strategy that became an integral part of Good Neighbor diplomacy. The United States refused to intervene in Nicaragua to counter Somoza's growing power which culminated in the ouster of President Sacasa in 1936.³² Further proof of a U.S. commitment to non-intervention came in 1937 when the United States refused to intervene and settle a border dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras that threatened war between the two states. Instead, the dispute was settled through mediation efforts.

Many circumstances presented opportunities for the United States to fall back on military intervention to secure its objectives in the Caribbean. Each time, the United States used diplomacy instead of intervention as the means of resolution.³³ However, a principal reason intervention was abandoned by FDR was because it could not achieve his primary objective of hemispheric solidarity as a counter the German threat. There was no desire to turn nationalist

³² Ibid., 31-2.

³³ Ibid., 33-8.

sentiment against the United States and intervention would have been counter-productive. In this respect, non-intervention was more a diplomatic strategy rather than a firm and unwavering commitment by the United States.³⁴

America's recovery from the depression was also a factor in FDR's Latin American equation. In speeches, he touted Latin America as a source of new markets for the United States and as means of fostering closer ties.

Latin America was also searching for ways to recover from economic depression. As a result, many reciprocal trade agreements between the United States and 15 Latin countries were negotiated during this time.³⁵ However, U.S. trade policy lacked clear direction and conflicts between protectionists and advocates of trade expansion went unresolved.³⁶ As a result, few economic gains for either the United States or Latin America were realized from these

³⁴ "Non-intervention was never an absolute reality-only an illusion that was valuable in popularizing the Good Neighbor principle." Ibid., 39.

³⁵ These trade agreements were signed from 1933 through 1945. Eleven of these were signed before 1940. Irwin Gellman offers a brief but interesting analysis of six of these agreements involving Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, Cuba, Colombia, and Venezuela. Ibid., 48.

³⁶ Ibid., 40.

agreements.³⁷ Nevertheless, expanded trade remained an important element of the Good Neighbor policy as implied in the first principle and specified in the fifth principle.

D. WAS THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY SUCCESSFUL?

Table 1 is a graphic representation of the analysis above. Each Good Neighbor policy objective is rated from very high to very low in terms of its relevance to the sub-regions identified. A subjective evaluation of each objective's importance to the success of the Good Neighbor policy is provided. Each sub-region is also given an overall rating based on the total relevance of each objective in that sub-region. This is a subjective evaluation of the sub-region's relative importance to achieving the regional goals of the Good Neighbor policy.

At this point, emphasis will be placed on determining the importance of each issue in order to make a determination as to the success or failure of the Good Neighbor policy. The relevance of the vertical summation and each sub-region's

³⁷ U.S. exports to Latin America rose an average of 1.7 percent from 1936 to 1939 while imports rose .7 percent. Latin American exports to the United States for the same period rose 4.6 percent while imports rose 7.7 percent, reflecting the loss of European trade as the result of war. The problems with U.S. foreign economic policy at the time stemmed in large part from the internal rivalry between Secretary of State Hull and Welles on this and other issues. Ibid., 58.

overall rating will be analyzed and discussed in Chapter III.

A horizontal evaluation of each issue indicates that security cooperation and countering German influence in Latin America was the primary goal of the Good Neighbor policy. Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean were rated "very high" for this issue due to the emphasis Good Neighbor policy diplomacy placed on hemispheric solidarity and the strategic significance of the Mexican oil, the Panama Canal, and Caribbean trade routes. Brazil, the Southern Cone, and the Andean sub-regions were rated "very high" not only due to their strategic significance in terms of raw materials, but also due to the concern over German influence.

The issue of nationalism in Latin America ties with expanded free trade in overall significance with an overall rating of "high to very high". Mexico, Brazil, the Southern Cone, and Andean sub-regions ratings of "very high" are due primarily to U.S. concerns over the expropriation of U.S. private property, particularly U.S. oil company holdings.

The overall rating of "high to very high" for expanded free trade is based upon the significance of each sub-region to the U.S. economy and the potential for expanded trade. This includes involvement by U.S. businesses, especially oil companies, and the bilateral trade agreements that

resulted from Good Neighbor diplomacy. From a somewhat different perspective, security cooperation and countering German influence could be tied to the issue of nationalism under one major category called U.S. security concerns. In this analysis, two broad categories of issues become evident - U.S. security concerns and regional economic priorities.

TABLE 1. SPECIFIC AND OVERALL RATINGS FOR LATIN AMERICAN SUB-REGIONS AND U.S. ISSUES AND INTERESTS DURING THE "GOOD NEIGHBOR" ERA

| Issue/ Interest | Sub-Regions | | | | | | Rating |
|--|--------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| | Mex- ico | Cent. Amer. | Carib- bean | An- dean | So. Cone | Braz- il | |
| Security Cooper- ation/ Countering German Influence | Very High | Very High | Very High | Very High | Very High | Very High | Very High |
| Countering Nation- alism | Very High | Med- ium | Med- ium | Very High | Very High | Very High | High- Very High |
| Expanded Free Trade | Very High | Med- ium | *Very High | High | Very High | Very High | High- V. High |
| Rating | Very High | Med- High | High | Very High | Very High | Very High | |

* This rating is due to Cuba's economic and political significance to the United States during the Good Neighbor era.

By linking these broad categories with specific Good Neighbor policy principles (GNPP) the correlations in Table

2 are evident. This perspective supports the contention that realizing U.S. security objectives was the primary goal of the Good Neighbor diplomacy. Four Good Neighbor policy principles relate directly to this issue.

TABLE 2. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY ISSUES AND GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY PRINCIPLES (GNPP)

| ISSUES | GNPP |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| Regional Economic Priorities 1) Expanded Trade | 1 & 5 |
| U.S. Security Concerns 1) Countering Nationalism 2) Security Cooperation/ Countering German Influence | 1 & 2 1, 2, 3, & 5 |

As a result of their successful application, nationalist sentiment in Latin America was neutralized by relying on diplomatic solutions to disputes rather than intervention. This approach made Latin American nations more receptive to U.S. proposals for security cooperation. Inter-American security cooperation was achieved and German influence in the Western Hemisphere was effectively countered.

Although expanded trade never fulfilled the hopes of some

in FDR's administration, the trade agreements that were signed did indirectly support the principle of hemispheric solidarity and moved the United States and Latin America closer together. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the Good Neighbor policy achieved most of its objectives including the most significant one.

The Good Neighbor policy secured vital U.S. interests while at the same time fostered an atmosphere of trust and cooperation between the United States and Latin America. The essence of the Good Neighbor policy principles were codified in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) in 1947 and the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948.³⁸ The broad mandates for inter-American cooperation outlined in these documents, and the mechanisms developed for their implementation, owe their beginnings to FDR and his administration.

E. THE END OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY

If the Good Neighbor policy was successful, why did it fade after World War II? The answer lies in the nature of the international system that would emerge after the war.

A tight, bipolar system emerged that pitted the United States and its western allies against the Soviets and their

³⁸ Ibid., ix-x.

client states. Communism was identified as the primary threat to U.S. national security. It represented the antithesis of American democratic values and containing its spread became the U.S. imperative. The strategy of containment was implemented for this purpose.³⁹

International relations were dominated by the ideological conflict between East and West. In the aftermath of World War II, the United States emerged as the only western power capable of meeting this threat. This global security responsibility left little room for diplomatic maneuvering or compromise on the part of U.S. policy-makers. Therefore, they embraced the strategy of containment as the best solution to the unique dilemmas they faced.

Bryce Wood argues that the cooperative security arrangements between the United States and Latin America created by Good Neighbor diplomacy might have proved successful in countering the communist challenge in the

³⁹ NSC 68 and its endorsement of a perimeter defense strategy represented a departure from the concept of containment originally outlined by George F. Kennan. His policy recommendations were based on economic assistance to Europe and Asia for the purpose of reversing the "profound exhaustion of physical plant and of spiritual vigor" as the result of World War II, and restoring a balance of power. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1982), 36-91.

western hemisphere if given the chance.⁴⁰ He contends the dismantling of the Good Neighbor policy by the U.S. began in 1954 when the Eisenhower administration decided to side-step the OAS and intervene in Guatemala.⁴¹ He goes on to argue that the United States should have consulted with the other American States using the procedures set forth in the OAS charter. In his view, this might have resulted in some action to meet the perceived threat to U.S. security without the need for unilateral intervention.⁴²

Woods' opinion, however, neglects the importance of NSC-68 in guiding U.S. policy decisions and its enormous implications for U.S. actions in the world. NSC-68 stated the Soviet Union was out to demonstrate that only the Kremlin had the will to use force and that those not willing to use force to achieve their goals were doomed. Therefore, perceptions of the balance of power became just as important as the actual balance itself in maintaining world order and U.S. security.⁴³

⁴⁰ Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), 197-8.

⁴¹ Ibid., 204-5.

⁴² Ibid., 206.

⁴³ John I. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1982), 92.

NSC-68 also defined any extension of Soviet domination as an increase in their power. This made any Soviet advances along the "perimeter" of equal importance.⁴⁴ Military confrontation became the predominant element of power in the new order and the developing nations became the battlefield of the Cold War. The battle in the Western Hemisphere expanded and military intervention regained its position as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Bryce Wood states that the "dismantling" of the Good Neighbor policy, which began with the Guatemalan intervention in 1954, was completed by the Carter administrations purposeful adoption of a bilateral approach in its relations with Latin countries.⁴⁵ Throughout this period, and continuing to the end of the Cold War in 1989, the cooperative security arrangements created by Good Neighbor diplomacy remained incongruous with the expedient priorities of U.S. national security and U.S. responsibilities as the leader of the western world.

⁴⁴Ibid., 91.

⁴⁵ Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), 208-9.

III. U.S. INTERESTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The bi-polar system that maintained equilibrium during the Cold War no longer exists and power is being diffused at an accelerated pace. The world is in a period of transition. In the United States, there are calls from neo-isolationists for the United States to withdrawal from the world stage and adopt policies to insulate the United States from foreign influence.

In this changed environment, what are the interests of the United States? How do these interests translate into issues that can be related to U.S. objectives in Latin America?

A. NEW PARADIGM, NEW THREATS?

In many respects, the world today resembles the world of the period between World War I and World War II. Instability is the natural result of the turbulence caused by transition. President George Bush and his administration draw parallels between the forces of isolationism that exist in the United States today and the domestic mood in the 1920s.⁴⁶ A number of alternative futures seem possible

⁴⁶ The White House, National Security Strategy of the U.S. (August, 1991), 2.

depending on the choices of today's leaders and their ability to mobilize resources, individually or collectively, to achieve their objectives.

On the economic front, the world appears to be moving toward a system balanced between regional trade blocs, each dominated by a major economy (United States in the Americas, Germany in the EEC, and Japan in Asia). Whether the interactions between these blocs will be peaceful or antagonistic has yet to be determined.

On the political front, the United States has emerged as the pivotal actor in world events, at least for the moment. Administration policy implies a determined effort to keep the United States in the forefront and "not to retreat from the world's problems".⁴⁷ In this effort, U.S. leadership is considered "pivotal and inescapable".⁴⁸ However, the administration's strategy calls for reliance on alliances, international organizations, and cooperative security arrangements as the primary means of ensuring world stability.⁴⁹

The National Security Strategy of the United States identifies many of the forces of change that the United

⁴⁷ Ibid., v.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

States will have to confront in the pursuit of its interests. Those applicable to Latin America are discussed in the following sub-sections.⁵⁰

1. "The Growing Role of Germany and Japan"

As in the 1920s and 1930s, Germany and Japan have again emerged as primary players on the world stage. Administration policy-makers call this "one of the most important and far-reaching strategic developments of a new era".⁵¹

Germany and Japan will play major parts in shaping the new world order as the economic front-runners in the European Economic Community (EEC) and Asia. U.S. policy supports this development. However, it also recognizes the fact that the United States, Germany, and Japan have occasionally been bitter competitors in the economic arena.⁵² Complete integration of the EEC will represent a formidable challenge to U.S. economic leadership.⁵³ An

⁵⁰ Ibid., 5.

⁵¹ Ibid., 6.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Some of the technical obstacles include opposition to the elimination of frontier controls, harmonization of indirect taxes and national tax systems, and reaching a consensus on the liberalization of capital movements and reciprocity in international banking practices. Gita Bhatt, "Europe 1992: The Quest for Economic Integration", in Finance

Asian trade bloc consisting of Japan, the Republic of Korea, China, Singapore, and Taiwan could also be established.⁵⁴

The combined output of these countries already threatens to exceed U.S. output.⁵⁵ These developments could result in a shift in the balance of economic power. Additionally, competition between old allies on the economic front could create a hostile economic environment on a global scale.

Abraham F. Lowenthal claims Latin America may gain new importance to the United States as an export market due to demographics and the prospects for economic growth in the region which "translates more directly into U.S. exports than in the case of other regions".⁵⁶ This idea builds on upon his concept of linking overall U.S. hemispheric policy to the economic recovery of the United States. In his view,

and Development (June 1989): 40-2.

⁵⁴ Many economists believe trading blocs are the way of the future. Hang-Sheng Cheng, Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (FRBSF) points to two recent developments that suggest trade regionalism is on the rise. First, the decision by the EEC to achieve full integration by 1992. Second, The conclusion of the free trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada in 1988. Hang-Sheng Cheng, "Toward Trade Blocs?", FRBSF Weekly Letter (5 August, 1988).

⁵⁵ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (March, 1990): 6.

⁵⁶ Abraham Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

this is the best way to spur hemispheric economic growth.⁵⁷ Lowenthal also points out the need to gain the backing of U.S. domestic groups such as labor unions, banks, human rights groups, Latino communities, and religious groups for a program designed to promote overall hemispheric cooperation.⁵⁸

The Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) could be the first step towards filling Lowenthal's prescription. Latin America is reacting favorably to this initiative which includes multi-lateral free trade agreements, a hemispheric free trade zone, investment funds for Latin American economic reform and development, and creative debt reduction schemes that include "debt for nature" swaps.⁵⁹

Whether free trade area encompassing the entire Western Hemisphere is ever realized is not the most important issue. The broad vision of the initiative has already generated positive results. Many Latin American countries are pursuing free trade and investment framework agreements with the United States as the first step in the

⁵⁷ Ibid., 197.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 198.

⁵⁹ Ron Scherer, "Latin Plan Launches New Partnership," The Christian Science Monitor (3 July, 1990): 4. "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative," GIST, (21 September): 1990.

process towards free trade agreements. Negotiations are underway on a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Mexico, Canada, and the U.S. If it becomes a reality, the NAFTA would likely be the baseline for similar agreements between the United States and Latin countries.⁶⁰

Latin Americans themselves are also moving forward with the creation and re-vitalization of sub-regional integration schemes and bilateral agreements.⁶¹ One of the purposes of these arrangements may be to bring collective leverage to bear on the United States in future trade negotiations. Nevertheless, these actions promote interdependence and

⁶⁰ See Ron Scherer, "Latin Plan Launches New Partnership", reported in The Christian Science Monitor (3 July, 1990): 4.

⁶¹ The following are some of the ongoing initiatives; the U.S. and Canada are working with Mexico to secure a free trade agreement this year; Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua signed a complimentary economic agreement to work towards a free trade zone in 1996, "Calderon on Free Trade, Oil," (in Spanish), translated and reported in FBIS LAT-91-009 (14 January 1991), 1. The Andean Bloc nations have also begun free trade talks. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay have plans for a common market by 1995. Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Honduras, and Costa Rica have signed bilateral framework agreements with the U.S. to implement initiatives under the "Enterprise for the Americas" initiative, and Venezuela and Peru are working on similar agreements with the United States. Richard C. Schroder, " A Languid Pursuit of Free Trade", reported in Times of the Americas, (January, 1991). Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay have completed a framework agreement with the United States.

cooperation at the sub-regional level which, in turn, enhance the chances for achieving hemispheric free trade.

Latin Americans realize the world is moving towards free market economics. This is a positive development for the United States as long as Latin Americans continue to link their economic future with the United States. The failure to successfully negotiate and approve the NAFTA could prove disastrous for other free trade agreements and the broad objectives of the EAI. It could also send a signal to the rest of Latin America that their economic future lies elsewhere. In the short term, the impact on the United States would likely be minimal. However, over the long-term, such a development could strip the United States of a significant portion of its economic might vis-a-vis the EEC (led by Germany) and the Asian bloc (led by Japan).

2. "The Soviet Future"

Severe economic conditions in the Soviet Union have forced a strategic retreat on the international front. This has created a power vacuum to will be filled by others. In Eastern Europe, the end of Soviet domination has resulted in the re-unification of Germany. Soviet weakness and the rekindled fires of nationalism sustained the drive for independence and autonomy in the Baltics. These same forces are still a factor in the push for autonomy by the various Soviet republics.

In effect, a "fundamental transformation" is underway in the Soviet Union as well as the rest of the world.⁶² This change has reduced the primacy of ideology in Soviet foreign affairs.⁶³ However, Soviet military strength is still considered a potential threat in single flank or regional scenarios.⁶⁴

In the western hemisphere, political liberalization and the withdrawal of the Soviet Union has led to the rise of more democratic forms of government. This trend provides the opportunity to secure one of the most fundamental pan-American interests - to create an environment of hemispheric solidarity strong enough to counter the establishment of "the hostile foreign ideological base" and make the Americas safe for democracy.⁶⁵

In the future, the most significant threat to the goal of securing democracy will likely be similar to those the United States faced in the 1930s. Fascism took root in South America because it offered the promise of recovery

⁶² The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (August, 1991), 5.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Hayes, Margaret Daly, "U.S. Security Interests in Central America", in Contadora and the Diplomacy of Peace in Central America, Vol. 1 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 5.

from the severe economic depression. If democracy does not fulfill the political, social, and economic expectations of Latin Americans today, it seems plausible that the ultra-nationalistic sentiment evident in other parts of the world could take seed in Latin America sparking a new round of authoritarianism.

3. "Regional Trends"

The power vacuum created by the end of the Cold War paradigm has created an environment where regional conflicts may escalate. These conflicts could severely hamper any attempt to achieve a peaceful world order and lead to a prolonged state of instability similar to the period from World War I through World War II. Such an environment would increase the possibility that radical ideologies and authoritarianism will re-emerge. As a result, U.S. security strategy is putting more emphasis on responses to regional conflicts to meet this threat.⁶⁶

The end of the bi-polar power system and its relative stability has unleashed old rivalries and tensions previously suppressed. The August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the current civil war in Yugoslavia are two

⁶⁶ As discussed in a presentation entitled "Evolution of the National Military Strategy", during the 1991 Fleet CINC Planners' Conference at the Naval Post Graduate School (5-7 March, 1991).

examples of these forces in action.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has created its own set of problems. The Ukraine has declared independence from the Russian Republic and the central government. The more ethnic republics have also claimed their independence and strong nationalistic sentiment rooted in ethnicity has many of these republics on the brink of civil war.

In South Asia, Indo-Pakistani tensions still run high. If a major military confrontation erupted between these two nations, the possibility that nuclear weapons would be used cannot be disregarded.

In East Asia, the United States is re-evaluating its presence requirements and security needs. The security relationship between the United States and Japan may be revised. This could have serious implications for the entire region especially if it results in a more capable and more active Japanese military force.

North Korea's pursuit of a nuclear capability is a troubling dilemma for the United States as it re-evaluates its presence on the Korean peninsula. While there is little or no immediate threat to South Korea, the acquisition of a nuclear capability by North Korea is a probability. In the absence of U.S. forces, this would be a significant shift in the regional balance of power and could increase the

possibility of conflict.

Through all of this, the Western Hemisphere has emerged as a bastion of democracy. Soviet expansionism is no longer a threat to U.S. security interests, and the vast majority of Latin countries have begun the transition to more democratic forms of government. However, there are still many complex political and socio-economic problems that could reverse this trend. These include continued repression, political violence, and active insurgencies.

A U.N. brokered peace settlement in El Salvador may be concluded soon. However, this will not result in the immediate resolution to the fundamental differences between the Farabundo Marti Liberation Movement (FMLN) insurgents and the Salvadoran government. Hard questions remain unanswered concerning the demobilization of insurgents and government forces, past violations of human rights, verification mechanisms, and the incorporation the FMLN into the democratic process. Preserving the peace in El Salvador will be a long-term proposition.

In Guatemala, UN sponsored negotiations between the government and guerrillas offer some hope but a final settlement is still an illusive proposition.⁶⁷

Additionally, it is doubtful the right wing Guatemalan

⁶⁷ Ibid.

military would voluntarily relinquish a significant portion of the power it now holds within the Guatemalan political structure.

In Nicaragua, political liberalization is off to a shaky start. The Chamorro government's tentative hold on political power is still threatened by those who control important positions within the government bureaucracy and the military. Assassinations of ex-Contras and general dissatisfaction with the Chamorro government have caused some ex-Contra's to rearm. A resumption of hostilities between the "re-Contras" and government forces could unravel the fragile democracy now in place.

Panama's shaky democracy also calls into question that country's future and the ability of the United States to directly affect events in Central America. Barring any new agreements between the U.S. and Panama, the relocation of the U.S. Southern Command (USCINCSOUTH) to the continental United States and the end of a permanent U.S. military presence in Panama will be effected by 31 December, 1999 in accordance with the Panama Canal Treaties.⁶⁶ This

⁶⁶ There are two distinct treaties that together compose the Panama Canal Treaties. The basic treaty provides for the termination and succession of all previous treaties and includes the provisions for the gradual transfer of control of the Panama Canal from the U.S. to Panama by the year 2000. The second treaty is the "Treaty on the Permanent Neutrality

is a significant development as Central America's geographic proximity has traditionally made it one of the most important sub-regions to U.S. security interests.

In the Caribbean, there are no signs that Fidel Castro is ready to end his dictatorship and embark on a significant program of political liberalization in Cuba. Castro still stands as a roadblock to political reform and Cuba's future is still uncertain. Democracy is not assured in the rest of the Caribbean either as evidenced by the recent coup attempt in Trinidad and Tobago and the successful coup in Haiti.

Economic conditions are far from stable in the countries of the Southern Cone, making a return to authoritarianism in that sub-region a possibility that

and Operation of the Canal". Article 5 of this treaty states that "After the termination of the Panama Canal Treaty (basic treaty), only the Republic of Panama shall operate the canal and maintain military forces, defence sites and military installations within its national territory". During the ratification process in the U.S. Senate, two reservations to Article 5 were approved and included in resolution of ratification including a statement. The first reserves the right of independent action by either the U.S. or Panama to secure the continued operation of the canal including the use of military force if required. The second reserves the right of the U.S. and Panama to enter into any follow-on agreements that may be required to preserve the neutrality of the canal including agreements to station U.S. forces. Degenhardt, Henry W., Treaties and Alliances of the World, 3rd ed. (Essex, UK: Longman Group Limited, 1981), 317-8.

cannot be ignored. Additionally, many traditional territorial disputes remain unresolved even though some progress has been made such as the successfully concluded border negotiations between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel, most still remain unresolved.

In the Andean sub-region, the continued expansion of Sendero Luminoso calls into question that country's political future. Sendero's successes combined with severe economic problems increase the possibility of a coup by military hardliners.⁶⁹ Additionally, the possibility that Sendero Luminoso could expand operations into northern Chile and Bolivia raises the possibility of a resurgence of military activity in these countries to counter this threat.

Despite the rise of democracy in Latin America, regional conflicts and traditional disputes still stand as significant obstacles to overcome on the road to a truly democratic hemisphere. The dilemma for U.S. policy-makers is how to pursue U.S. interests and support Latin America's democratic transition without arousing resentment and rekindling traditional fears of U.S. domination. The wrong policy approach could negatively impact the goal of

⁶⁹ For a detailed analysis of the situation in Peru, see Gordon H. McCormick, the Shining Path and the Future of Peru (March, 1990).

"securing democracy" in the Western Hemisphere.⁷⁰

4. "Stemming Proliferation"

The availability of advanced military technology and the proliferation of conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons is contributing to worldwide instability. In the mid-1980s, world-wide weapons production expanded to meet global demand.⁷¹ To meet this threat in the 1990s, U.S. policy calls for more emphasis on regional arms control especially efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

While the main thrust of the U.S. effort in this area is still East-West strategic arms reduction and the European theater, more concern and effort is being placed on other parts of the world. The Bush administration is pursuing a "three tiered non-proliferation strategy" in this effort.⁷² This consists of "strengthen[ing] existing non-proliferation arrangements, expanding membership in multi-lateral regimes directed against proliferation, and the

⁷⁰ Robert A. Pastor, "Forging a Hemispheric Bargain: The Bush Opportunity", in Journal of International Affairs, Vol.43, No.1 (Summer/Fall, 1989): 70.

⁷¹ In 1986 individual nations spent over \$800 billion on weapons. Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations (New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1988), 544.

⁷² The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (August, 1991): 15.

pursuit of new initiatives".⁷³

The new initiatives include multi-lateral efforts such as the Australia Group meeting in May where 20 of the world's major chemical suppliers agreed to place controls on equipment and other materials that could be used to manufacture chemical weapons. They also include a continued effort to complete the Chemical Weapons Convention to control the export and sales of chemical and biological weapons related technologies.⁷⁴

Greater control over missile technology is also a goal of the U.S. administration. Towards this end, U.S. policy calls for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to be strengthened through expanded membership and improved controls.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the center-piece in the world-wide effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons. The Bush administration highlights three examples where progress can be claimed. The first is in Iraq where dismantlement of that country's nuclear weapons facilities is proceeding as mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 687. The second is in South Asia where India and Pakistan have agreed to ban

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

attacks on each other's nuclear facilities. The third is in South America where Brazil and Argentina have agreed to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their nuclear facilities and to take steps towards making Latin America a nuclear free zone as agreed to in the Treaty of Tlatelolco.⁷⁵

However, these examples of progress also highlight some of the difficulties inherent in controlling nuclear weapons proliferation. In the case of Iraq, access to nuclear sites and facilities was gained only after its defeat in the Gulf War. If this had not occurred, it is likely Iraq would have continued its pursuit of a nuclear capability largely unabated. In the Indian-Pakistani case, the commitments made depend mainly on the goodwill of the parties involved. This is also true for Brazil and Argentina in terms of their willingness to allow IAEA oversight.

5. "Illicit Drugs"

International drug trafficking has been identified as a "major threat" to U.S. national security and Latin America is the principal focus of U.S. concern.⁷⁶ The United States is the primary market for illegal coca products from Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia where coca is the

⁷⁵ Ibid., 17.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 17.

number one export.⁷⁷ Mexico is a principal transit route for cocaine entering the United States and it is the source of 80 percent of the marijuana on the U.S. market.⁷⁸

Additionally, Jamaica and Belize are active suppliers of marijuana while Central America and the Caribbean are major transit routes for illegal narcotics bound for the United States.⁷⁹

The Bush administration's strategy to counter this threat calls for demand reduction and an "aggressive attack" on drug producers. In the Western Hemisphere, this includes working with countries in the Andean sub-region to enhance local law enforcement and military efforts and increase public and leadership awareness of the threat. U.S. economic strategies in this area are intended to strengthen and diversify the legal economies of the Andean countries.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Thomas J. Chassee and Michael M. Cobb, Narcotics and National Security: Refining the Military Option, MA Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1990), 2.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 7.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 12-4.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

Raphael Perl describes U.S. congressional foreign policy on illicit drugs as "more 'stick' than 'carrot'".⁸¹ He goes on to describe U.S. international narcotics control policy as consisting of four elements: *eradication measures, interdiction and law enforcement, international cooperation, and sanctions.*⁸² To further his argument, Perl discusses three pieces of congressional legislation through which the U.S. Congress has exercised its power over this major foreign policy issue. These are:

- The Anti-drug Abuse Act of 1988 which contains provisions relating to many federal programs designed to "curb the supply, use, and abuse of dangerous drugs in the United States".⁸³
- The National Defense Authorization Act for 1989 that has directly involved the Department of Defense (DOD) in the war on drugs.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Raphael Perl, "International Narcopolicy and the Role of Congress", in The Latin American Narcotics trade and U.S. National Security, Donald J. Malbry, ed. (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1989), 89.

⁸² Ibid., 90-1.

⁸³ Ibid., 93-100.

⁸⁴ Key elements of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 include: DOD support to civilian drug enforcement agencies, the integration of DOD intelligence assets into the anti-drug intelligence network, authorization to use the National Guard and other DOD assets in interdiction operations. Ibid., 100-1.

- The Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act for 1989 through which Congress exercises its "power of the purse" to establish U.S. policy designed to both persuade and dissuade drug producing countries to cooperate with the United States in its anti-drug effort.⁸⁵

It does seem apparent that the primary focus of U.S. policy on this issue is on attacking supply. This has the potential to become a serious foreign policy quagmire for the United States as it pursues its overall interests in Latin America. For instance, when does interdiction become intervention? How far can the United States go in dictating anti-drug policy to its Latin neighbors without raising questions of sovereignty and undermining its ability to achieve other important regional objectives? Can cooperative strategies achieve U.S. objectives in the war on drugs? If not, how far is the United States prepared to go to secure this "major interest"?

There is a serious divergence that exists between the Latin American and U.S. perspective on this issue. Latin Americans view the problem as primarily a result of demand in the United States. On the other hand, United States policy appears to place greater emphasis on supply

⁸⁵ Provisions of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act for 1989 are designed to "intensify efforts aimed at interdiction and eradication of illicit narcotics, and seek international cooperation on narcotics enforcement matters". Ibid., 99-102.

side counter-measures. Latin American cooperation with the United States to date seems to be in large part due to their desire to qualify for U.S. monetary aid and reduce narco-violence within their own borders rather than an embrace of U.S. policy.

There is no clear parallel between this non-traditional threat to the United States and any threat posed to the United States during the era of Good Neighbor diplomacy. In fact, there appears to be a close parallel between the threat of illicit drugs coming from Latin America and the ideological threat of a communist stronghold in Latin America during the Cold War. These parallels can be summed up as follows:

- Sheer geographic proximity to the United States of a threat defined as "major" or vital to U.S. interests.
- A divergence of perceptions between the United States and Latin America as to the nature of the threat.
- A willingness on the part of the United States to use military forces to combat the threat.
- The lack of a clear consensus between the President and Congress on U.S. foreign policy objectives concerning the threat.

Without a clearly defined and consensual U.S. policy on this issue, it is unclear whether cooperative strategies can achieve all expectations in the war on drugs. This enhances the possibility of unilateral actions being taken by the United States to combat this threat without first

weighing the effects of this action against its effects on other important U.S. regional interests. For this reason, perhaps no other issue has the potential to derail a broad effort to enhance regional cooperation based on Good Neighbor principles.

6. "Immigrants and Refugees"

The number of dislocations world-wide is now 16 million.⁸⁶ This represents an increase of 2 million from 1990.⁸⁷ The problems exacerbating this crisis range from famine to brutal oppression. The United States has pledged to do its share to help alleviate this problem but, at the same time, admits to its own limitations in this area.⁸⁸

Latin migration to the United States has been the result of both "push" factors in host countries such as war, political violence, and socio-economic hardship, and "pull" factors in the U.S. such as the need for unskilled labor.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (August, 1991): 18.

⁸⁷ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (March, 1990): 17.

⁸⁸ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (August, 1991): 18.

⁸⁹ See Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Latin America in the 1990s: Not Berlin but Still Germane", in Hemisfile (May, 1990), 2. Georges A. Fauriol, "The Third Century: U.S. Latin American Policy Choices in the 1990s", in CSIS Significant Issues

Another way to view this is to see the problem as the result of favorable socioeconomic and political conditions in the United States as compared to opposite conditions in many parts of Latin America.⁹⁰

Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico account for the vast majority of immigration to the United States from Latin America.⁹¹ In Central America, a resolution of ongoing conflicts could help reduce the flow of immigrants to the United States. Additionally, the end of repression in some Caribbean nations could also prove beneficial. In Mexico, Diego C. Asencio forecasts two divergent possibilities for the future. The positive scenario foresees economic recovery in Mexico resulting in a reduction of migration to the United States. The negative scenario foresees a continuation of economic difficulties and the continued flow of immigrants to the United States.⁹²

In 1990, The Commission for the Study of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development

Series, Vol.X, No.13 (undated): 29-30.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 29.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Diego C. Asencio, Immigration and Economic Development for the 21st Century (undated).

reported to the President and Congress on its prescription to resolve the problem of undocumented immigration to the United States. The consensus was that job-creating economic growth was the best solution to stopping the flow of illegal immigrants.⁹³ This conclusion carried with it the following caveats:

- It will take decades before economic growth reached the point where illegal immigration was sufficiently reduced.
- Continued enforcement to stem the flow of illegal migrants is needed in the meantime.⁹⁴

Georges A Fauriol points out that immigration is an important issue that the United States has had to deal with throughout its history, though it has recently taken on a "salient Latin American dimension".⁹⁵ He recommends U.S. policy initiatives in this area focus primarily on regional economic growth and hemispheric political stability rather than law enforcement.⁹⁶ Such an approach seems most likely to resolve the immigration and refugee problem over the long-term. It also seems more likely to result in cooperation from Latin America on this issue.

⁹³ Ibid., 8.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Georges A. Fauriol, The Third Century: U.S. Latin American Policy Choices for the 1990s (undated): 29.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 30.

7. "Debt"

The projection of the aggregate debt owed by developing countries for 1990 was \$1.3 trillion.⁹⁷ The primary causes of this problem according to the Bush administration are overvalued exchange rates, large budget deficits, poor investments, and restrictions on trade and investment leading to capital flight.⁹⁸ Other problems linked to the debt crisis include high international interest rates, the 1980s recession, and fluctuations in energy prices due to the Gulf War.⁹⁹

Latin America's share of the world's aggregate debt burden was \$410 billion in 1990, or about one-third.¹⁰⁰ Servicing this debt has created a net outflow of 3 percent of the region's total output and more than 20 percent of its export earnings.¹⁰¹ High inflation rates have compounded this problem in many countries.

The 1990 Report of the Inter-American Dialogue outlines three options to overcome the debt problem.

⁹⁷ Source: the World Bank as quoted in National Security Strategy of the United States (August, 1991): 20.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ The Americas in a New World, The 1990 Report of the Inter-American Dialogue (1990): 19.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

These are:

- Reduce commercial debt burdens under the debt reduction proposals of the Brady Plan.
- Forego formal debt-reduction agreements, continue interest payments, and try to trim the debt through debt-equity and direct purchasing.
- Unilaterally reduce or stop interest payments through a moratorium or debt payment ceilings.¹⁰²

The report indicates that debt reduction under option one is slow and, therefore, its usefulness is limited to countries whose economies are performing fairly well.¹⁰³ To date only Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Chile have negotiated debt reduction agreements under the Brady Plan.¹⁰⁴ Option two is recommended only for "the region's strongest performers". Discounting Chile, Colombia is the sole candidate.¹⁰⁵ This leaves option three for the remaining countries. Of the fifteen countries that are behind in their interest payments, Brazil and Argentina lead the group with \$15 billion in unpaid interest in 1990.¹⁰⁶ This problem has major implications for other important U.S.

¹⁰² Ibid., 21-2.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 21.

¹⁰⁴ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, (August, 1991): 20.

¹⁰⁵ The Americas in a New World, The 1990 Report of the Inter-American Dialogue (1990): 21.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 22.

objectives. Maintaining large debt burdens will likely reduce the positive impact of regional free trade. It will also hinder Latin America's overall economic recovery. This could create an atmosphere of discontent and pave the way for a new era of authoritarianism in the region.

8. "The Environment"

The array of global environmental problems of specific concern to the Bush administration policy makers include ozone depletion, deforestation, bio-diversity, the treatment of wastes, climatic change, food security, and water supply.¹⁰⁷ Of all these issues, deforestation of the Amazon and the treatment of wastes (industrial pollution) in Mexico may become the major environmental dilemmas for U.S.-Latin American relations in the future.

Primary rain forest depletion in Latin America is most evident in Brazil, Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia. The amount of original rain forest remaining in these countries is 63 percent, 60 percent, 71 percent, and 26 percent respectively.¹⁰⁸ These forests are cleared to make way for

¹⁰⁷ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (August, 1991), 22.

¹⁰⁸ Figures are from multiple sources and are based on surveys for roadless areas greater than 400,000 hectares where development is unlikely to have occurred. See Sandra Postel and John C. Ryan, "Reforming Forestry", in State of the World (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), 75.

crops, grazing land, and construction projects as well as to support these countries's timber industry.

However, the United States might find itself facing an embarrassing diplomatic predicament if it pursues a belligerent policy towards these countries's on this issue. The amount of primary forest remaining in the United States is 15 percent.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, the United States is the world's leading producer of wood products accounting for 25 percent of the world market as compared to Brazil's four percent. Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru each account for less than one percent of the market share.¹¹⁰

This is not to say the deforestation issue should be ignored in U.S.-Latin relations. But it does seem that low-profile diplomacy and cooperative economic strategies represent the best hope for success in this area. As a relatively prosperous post-industrial nation, the United States runs the risk of appearing ingenuous if it attempts to dictate ecological policy to newly industrialized and developing nations. This is particularly true in Latin America given the high priority countries of the region place on economic development as a means toward achieving

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Source: U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, *Forest Products Yearbook*, as published in State of the World, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 1991), 76.

long-term economic growth.

NAFTA negotiations have placed Mexico in the spotlight of environmentalist scrutiny. In an effort to derail the NAFTA initiative, environmentalists have joined forces with U.S. labor unions in an effort to defeat this legislation in Congress. This marriage has produced a hybrid lobbying effort that emphasizes "the vast differences in regulatory structures and social protections" between the United States and Mexico.¹¹¹ In their view, U.S.-Mexico free trade will make it difficult for producers based in the United States to compete with their Mexican based counterparts. The predicted result is the loss of jobs in the United States and the exacerbation of already existing ecological problems along the U.S.-Mexican border including indiscriminate dumping, irrigation and drinking water pollution, wildlife extinction, toxic industrial accidents, and the lack of waste treatment facilities.¹¹²

The question for U.S. policy here seems to be one of priorities. Do immediate environmental concerns about the NAFTA outweigh its long-term potential for bolstering the economies of both the United States and Mexico? This issue

¹¹¹ The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, Exploiting Both Sides: U.S.-Mexico Free Trade (February, 1991), 7.

¹¹² Ibid.

represents a dilemma that the administration of FDR did not have to confront in their trade negotiations with Latin American countries. The various elements of this issue are also illustrative of the complexity of inter-American relations in today's environment.

B. SUMMARIZING AND RATING THE ISSUES

Table 3 provides a graphic display of the issues discussed above. It also provides a subjective evaluation of these issues and subregions similar to Table 1.

The horizontal evaluation of the issues in table 3 indicates regional free trade and illicit drugs are the most significant issues to the U.S. when weighed in terms of subregions affected. Regional free trade is rated "very high" for Mexico, Brazil, the Southern Cone, and the Andean subregions primarily due to their economic growth potential. Central America and the Caribbean are rated lower due to their comparatively small economies. Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean and the Andean sub-regions receive a "very high" rating on the drug issue due to their positions as primary producers, transit areas, or both.

The Southern Cone's rates a "high", given the position of Bolivia as a primary producer of cocaine. Brazil is rated lower, given its lower relevance in terms of this issue.

TABLE 3. SPECIFIC AND OVERALL RATINGS FOR LATIN AMERICAN SUB-REGIONS AND CURRENT U.S. ISSUES AND INTERESTS

| Issue/ Interest | Sub-Regions | | | | | | Rating |
|------------------------------------|-------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------|------------------|
| | Mex- ico | Cent. Amer. | Carib- bean | An- dean | So. Cone | Bra- zil | |
| * Regional Free Trade | Very High | Med- ium | High | Very High | Very High | Very High | Very High |
| * Counter- ing Nation- alism | High | High | High | High | High | High | High |
| * Securing Democracy | Med- ium | Very High | Very High | High | High | High | High- v. High |
| Prolifer- ation | Very Low | Low | Very Low | Low | Very High | Very High | Med- ium |
| Illicit Drugs | Very High | Very High | Very High | Very High | High | Med- ium | Very High |
| Immigrants & Refugees | Very High | High | High | Low | Very Low | Very Low | Med- ium |
| Debt Reduction | Very High | Med- ium | High | High | Very High | Very High | High- v. High |
| The Envir- onment | Very High | Low | Very Low | High | Med- ium | Very High | Med- High |
| Rating | Very High | Med- High | Med- High | High | High | High- Very High | |

* In order, these are interpretations of "The Growing Role of Germany and Japan", "The Soviet Future", and "Regional Free Trade" in terms of their relevance to Latin America.

Securing democracy and debt reduction are the second most important U.S. regional issues indicated by the analysis in Table 3. On the issue of democracy, Central America and the

Caribbean receive the highest rating due to the tenuous hold of democracy in these sub-regions. Castro's continued intransigence is also a factor. In the Andean sub-region, the rating of "very high" is due to the threat Sendero Luminoso poses to the weak democracy in Peru and the possibility that the insurgency might spread to other countries. Concerning debt reduction, the criteria for all the ratings is a weighted basket of items including total amount of aggregate debt owed, progress on debt relief, and the amount of unpaid interest outstanding. The impact of sub-regional debt on overall regional economic growth is also a factor.

Countering nationalism stands alone as the next most significant issue with a rating of "high" for every sub-region. The threat nationalism and authoritarianism pose to the United States is their potential to negatively impact most every other U.S. objective in Latin America. These two forces have a history of cyclic interaction in Latin America. Environmental issues rank fourth in overall significance according to analysis in Table 3. Mexico and Brazil receive the rating of "very high" due to the potentially damaging impact of environmental concerns on NAFTA negotiations and the concern over deforestation in the Amazon. The deforestation issue is also why the Andean sub-region receives a rating of "high". The remaining sub-

regions receive a lower rating because of the lesser significance of the environmental issue in these areas as compared to the other sub-regions.

Stemming the proliferation of weapons and the problem of immigrants and refugees come in last with an overall significance of "medium". This is only because of the lesser number of sub-regions receiving high ratings on these issues. Brazil and the Southern Cone's rating of "very high" on the proliferation issue is due primarily to the potential of Brazil and Argentina becoming nuclear powers. The importance of the arms industry to Brazil is also a factor. Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean receive the higher ratings on the immigrant and refugee problem because the overwhelming amount of Latin migration to the United States originates from these sub-regions.

IV. WOULD A REGIONAL POLICY BASED ON GOOD NEIGHBOR PRINCIPLES ACHIEVE U.S. OBJECTIVES IN TODAY'S WORLD?

A U.S. policy towards Latin America based on Good Neighbor policy principles would likely entail a more equal sharing of regional power. The dilemma is "how much risk [is acceptable] in an era of strategic change, fiscal austerity, and great uncertainty"?¹¹³ If Good Neighbor principles were incompatible with U.S. security interests during the Cold War, might they be applicable to changed U.S. security objectives now that bi-polarity is giving way to multi-polarity? Would this require Good Neighbor principles to be re-interpreted to account for any differences between today's world and the regional environment during FDR's time?

A. A COMPARISON OF GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY OBJECTIVES AND U.S. INTERESTS TODAY

The purpose of this section is to delineate the similarities and differences between the policy goals of FDR and U.S. regional interests today. This evaluation will hopefully assist in determining the applicability of Good Neighbor principles to current U.S. interests.

¹¹³ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (March, 1990): 7.

1. The Issues

A further evaluation of Table 3 suggests these issues can logically be grouped together into two major categories similar to those identified for Good Neighbor objectives on page 20. The issues "regional free trade" and "debt reduction" could be categorized together under the broad term *regional economic priorities*. The remaining issues could be characterized as either *traditional* or *non-traditional U.S. security concerns*. Table 4 provides a side by side comparison of the broad and specific issues in Tables 1 and 3. This analysis indicates a general similarity between the broad objectives of the Good Neighbor policy and U.S. goals in the Western Hemisphere today. This seems to support the general parallel between the transitional nature of today's world environment and the unstable nature of the world FDR faced.

However, Table 4 also illustrates some important differences. First, the increased complexity of issues in today's world as compared to the Good Neighbor era is evidenced by difference in the sheer number of issues. Second, the security concerns today are mostly non-traditional as compared to the more conventional threats the United States faced in the 1930s and 1940s. This is probably due to the fact that there are no direct threats to U.S. security from extra-hemispheric powers at this time.

TABLE 4. A COMPARISON OF BROAD AND SPECIFIC ISSUES

| GOOD NEIGHBOR ISSUES | TODAY'S ISSUES |
|--|--|
| Regional Economic Priorities 1) Expanded Trade | Regional Economic Priorities 1) Regional Free Trade 2) Debt Reduction |
| U.S. Security Concerns 1) Countering Ultra-Nationalism 2) Security Cooperation/ Countering German Influence | U.S. Security Concerns (Traditional) 1) Countering Ultra-Nationalism 2) Securing Democracy U.S. Security Concerns (Non-Traditional) 1) Illicit Drugs 2) Stemming Weapons Proliferation 3) Immigrants & Refugees 4) The Environment |

A comparison of the overall ratings of issues in Tables 1 and 3 highlight one other difference. Even though they are less in number, the specific issues that relate to regional economic priorities today seem to carry at least equal weight against the issues comprising U.S. security concerns. This was not the case during the Good Neighbor

era, where there seems to be a clear hierarchy of issues with U.S. security concerns at the top.

2. The Sub-Regions

Comparing the overall sub-region ratings from Tables 1 and 3 suggests a general hierarchical correlation between the significance in each sub-region to U.S. interests today and their significance in the 1930s and 1940s. This correlation is indicative of the recent change in U.S. perspective concerning regional issues. During the Cold War period, Central America and the Caribbean would have undoubtedly received ratings of "very high" due to the geopolitical nature of issues at that time.

The differences between specific sub-region ratings in Tables 1 and 3 can be attributed to the added number and more diverse nature of the issues facing U.S. policy-makers today. However, it is also important to note that the sub-regional ratings in Table 1 are grouped closer together than those in Table 3. This may be an indication that sub-regional distinctions did not figure prominently in Good Neighbor diplomacy. The emphasis Good Neighbor principles placed on hemispheric solidarity and collective action also lend credence to this analysis.

In summary, the major parallels evidenced in Tables 1 and 3 seem to be broad in nature, while differences are apparent in the details of each issue and how they relate to

specific sub-regions. This indicates that Good Neighbor principles might be applicable but that some re-interpretation may be necessary.

B. ARE U.S. INTERESTS AND THE INTERESTS OF LATIN AMERICA CONVERGING?

Generalizations are often used to summarize the relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Richard Bloomfield believes the relationship is based on a dichotomy of interests. From the Latin perspective, this is "the enduring problem [of] how to cope with the greater power of the United States: how to benefit from it and how to avoid being dominated by it."¹¹⁴ From the U.S. perspective, the problem has been "how to prevent [U.S.] enemies from using the relative weakness of Latin American political institutions to threaten U.S. national interests."¹¹⁵ Similar points have been made by others.¹¹⁶ However,

¹¹⁴ Richard Bloomfield, "Suppressing the Interventionist Impulse", in Alternative to Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 115-6.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 116.

¹¹⁶ "The evolution of U.S.-Latin American relations....can perhaps best be summed up as a continuous drive for [U.S.] influence, if not control, in the Western Hemisphere". Michael Kryzanek, U.S. Latin American relations, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 94. "Shifting U.S. policy approaches-whether interventionist, noninterventionist,

accepting these statements outright runs the risk of masking important sub-regional issues in which the United States and Latin American states may share common interests.¹¹⁷

During the Cold War, inter-American cooperation was hindered by differences of method and priorities. With the end of the Cold War and political liberalization underway in Latin America, these differences are vanishing and the barriers to cooperation in many areas are beginning to come down. Regional free trade is an issue of great interest to both the United States and Latin America for the same reason - economic survival in a highly competitive global market place.

In 1984, Abraham Lowenthal called the democratic trend in Latin America an opportunity for "inter-American cooperation beyond the economic realm".¹¹⁸ This was a reflection of

developmentalist, or benign neglect-spring from...two basic objectives-to exclude foreign threats and to encourage stability". G. Atkins, Latin America in the International Security System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 109.

¹¹⁷ Robert A. Pastor, "Forging a Hemispheric Bargain: The Bush Opportunity", in Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Summer/Fall, 1989): 70. U.S. and Latin America: A Shared Destiny, a speech by Secretary of State James Baker before the Council of the Americas in Washington D.C., 1 May 1989, published in Current Policy Bulletin No. 1167 (June, 1989): 1.

¹¹⁸ Abraham Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 187.

his claim that, though the most important benefits to be derived from cooperation are in the resumption of economic growth and expanded trade, a concerted U.S. effort to enhance overall inter-American cooperation could have positive effects in other areas of U.S. concern such as strengthening democracy, curbing the drug trade, and promoting peace and security.¹¹⁹ He went on to say that multi-lateral efforts are far more likely to be successful than bilateral efforts. However he did qualify this statement by saying that the most important contributions the U.S. can make to the democratization process are indirect.¹²⁰

The elimination of Cold War restraints and imperatives makes the fulfillment of Lowenthal's general prescriptions and U.S. security objectives in Central America much more feasible today than in the mid 1980s. It is fair to say that Bloomfield is generally correct when he states that something has changed in the relationship between the U.S. and Latin America.¹²¹ For one, the traditional threats of the Cold War are no longer pre-imminent but neither have

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 181-195.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 188-9.

¹²¹ Richard Bloomfield, "Suppressing the Interventionist Impulse", in Alternative to Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 117.

they been completely relegated to the past as Bloomfield suggests.¹²² Cuba is still a concern even though changes and a turn toward democracy are viewed by U.S. administration policy-makers as "inevitable".¹²³ Regional conflicts are still considered serious threats to U.S. interests but not in terms of their geo-political implications and the need to contain the Soviet sphere of influence. As a result, new opportunities for inter-American cooperation have been opened.

With these new opportunities, new dangers also emerge. Despite Lowenthal's assertion that a cooperative approach could reduce the threat posed by the drug problem, this issue still represents a high priority, non-traditional security threat to the United States. As discussed in Chapter II, this issue has the potential to seriously dampen hopes for U.S.-Latin American cooperation on a large scale.¹²⁴

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, (August, 1991), 8.

¹²⁴ Bloomfield prefers to call the drug problem a U.S. "vulnerability" and rightly points out that it is the result of both the demand for drugs in the U.S. and Latin America's economic weakness. Richard Bloomfield, "Suppressing the Interventionist Impulse" in Alternative to Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 117.

A divergence does exist between U.S. and Latin interests on the issue of illicit drugs. From the Latin perspective, the primary concern is in-country narco-violence. United States concerns revolve around the corrosive effect drug use and narco-trafficking have on the social fabric of America. The difference in perspective is important in making a determination of how much risk the United States is willing to take in its policies concerning this threat.¹²⁵

Both U.S. and Latin American interests are being transformed by the forces shaping the new paradigm. Non-traditional threats to U.S. national interests have primacy over the traditional threats of the Cold War. At the same time, Latin America's interests are expanding as they see the world become more economically and politically interdependent.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ For a discussion of some unilateral and multi-lateral policy options see Donald J. Malbry, The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security (New York, NY: Greenwood Press, 1989).

¹²⁶ Georges A. Fauriol refers to this development as "the birth of a new Latin American regionalism" sparked by the actions of the most involved Latin American nations. He suggests an optimistic view of this phenomena indicates more dynamic leadership and political maturity in Latin America as well as changes in U.S. policy. These trends are also an indication that the U.S.-Latin American relations are reaching a "more mature plateau". Georges A. Fauriol, "The Third Century: U.S.-Latin American Policy Choices for the 1990s", CSIS Significant Issues Series, Vol.X, No.13 (undated), 13-4.

In this environment where interests overlap, achieving both U.S. and Latin American long-term objectives in a more competitive world may well depend on cooperation. From this perspective, the principles of the Good Neighbor policy may prove relevant to overall U.S. regional policy initiatives.

C. THE GOOD NEIGHBOR PRINCIPLES REVISITED

The following sub-sections are an attempt to re-interpret Good Neighbor policy principles as defined in Chapter I to fit the realities of today's regional environment.

1. The Creation and Maintenance of Cordial and Intimate Relations Between the United States and Other American Republics

This principle is the foundation of the Good Neighbor policy. Table 2 illustrates the applicability of this principle to all the objectives of the Good Neighbor policy. It represents an ideal relationship that may seem unattainable today, but could be realized when and if the transition to true regional interdependence occurs and global stability is achieved.

Cordial and intimate relations were never fully realized during the era of Good Neighbor diplomacy. The end of World War II did not result in an interdependent and secure world, and the pursuit of hemispheric solidarity quickly vanished as a goal of U.S. policy. However, the

honest attempt by FDR and his administration adhere to this principle was an important factor in the overall success of the Good Neighbor policy. In striving for the ideal, progress was made.

The diplomatic ground work necessary to move the United States in this direction has already been laid. In 1989, U.S. Secretary of State Baker addressed the Council of the Americas and stated his belief that "the region's democratic leaders are reaching out to the United States to offer a new partnership, one based on mutual respect and one based on shared responsibility" and that the administration of President Bush is also reaching out.¹²⁷ Deputy Secretary Eagleberger also represented to the OAS that President Bush sees the chance to create an historic new partnership within the hemisphere and that this goal is at the top of his agenda.¹²⁸ This reinforced the President's own statements to the Council of the Americas a year earlier when he said the U.S. "must offer [Central and South

¹²⁷ "U.S. and Latin America: A Shared Destiny", an address by Secretary of State James Baker before the Council of the Americas, Washington, D.C., 1 May 1989, published in Current Policy, Bulletin No.1167 (June, 1989): 1.

¹²⁸ "Western Hemisphere Holds Unique Place for Freedom", an address by Deputy Secretary Eagleberger to the 21st General Assembly of the OAS, Santiago, Chile, 3 June 1991, as published in Dispatch, Vol.2, No.23 (10 June, 1991): 414-7.

America] our help and something more, we must offer them our respect, the respect due one free nation from another, and the outreached hand of partnership."¹²⁹

The pursuit of this objective by the United States, even though it may never be fully achieved, would seem to be a key element to the successful application of Good Neighbor principles today just as it was in the 1930s and early 1940s. Attainment of this goal is not as important as the ideal it represents. It is the foundation upon which the other principles stand. Therefore, no re-interpretation seems appropriate.

2. The Principle of Continental Self-Defense and the Adoption of this Principle by All American Republics

Hemispheric security cooperation has been one of the most contentious issues in U.S.-Latin American relations. The Rio Treaty represents the codification of this principle. However, the ideological battle of the Cold War left too much room for interpretation. For instance, does the right of self-defense extend to ideology? From the perspective of the U.S. policy-makers who institutionalized the strategy of containment in NSC-68, the answer was yes. From the perspective of many Latins, communist insurgencies

¹²⁹ "Latin America's Year of Freedom", remarks by President Bush to the Council to the Americas, Washington, D.C., 22 May 1990, as published in Current Policy, Bulletin No.1286, (undated), 1-2.

and leftist movements were responses to indigenous social injustice and were not a threat to the United States.

What is the situation today? Richard Bloomfield believes the U.S. and Latin America have "the best opportunity since the Good Neighbor Policy of creating an effective collective security system in the Americas" now that the "ideological enemy [USSR]" that "has bedeviled" U.S. policy has adopted perestroika and glastnost.¹³⁰ His formula calls for an arrangement where Latin America assumes the responsibility for collective security taking U.S. security imperatives into account. This system would be built upon the initiatives of the Contadora Group and its Support Group. The OAS would become a "court of last resort".¹³¹

Bloomfield's plan seems a bit narrow given the complexity and diverse nature of today's regional security environment. For one, the drug issue seems to have replaced the threat of communism as the United State's most important security concern. From this perspective, drug interdiction has the potential to replace traditional intervention as a primary tool to secure this "major" U.S. interest.

¹³⁰ Richard Bloomfield, "Suppressing the Interventionist Impulse", in Alternative to Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 130-1.

¹³¹ Ibid., 131-3.

Bloomfield does not account for this kind of non-traditional threat in his analysis. Additionally, his solutions apparently would not include criteria for the use of force or a mechanism for implementing an inter-American decision to use force to secure multi-lateral security interests.

What are the alternatives? One possibility might be a re-alignment of the goals and objectives of the Inter-American system to fit the realities of today and to reflect a common vision for future hemispheric security cooperation. This could include a collective definition of hemispheric interests and the threats to those interests including non-traditional threats.¹³²

On the practical side, some changes to existing organs of the inter-American system would likely be required and some new mechanisms might be needed to fully implement multi-lateral decisions on issues of hemispheric security. This is especially true in the area of enforcement.

There are essentially three stages of cooperative actions to counter threats to and breeches of peace.

¹³² Georges Fauriol believes mechanisms such as the Rio Treaty and OAS need to be scrutinized to assure their continuing effectiveness. An important aspect of this process is a clear indication from the U.S. of its expectations from these mechanisms and active participation by the U.S. in their institutional development. Georges A. Fauriol, "The Third Century: U.S.-Latin American Policy Choices for the 1990s", in CSIS Significant Issues Series (undated), 16-17.

These are:

- Automatic actions that go into effect or are carried out by prior agreement without the need for further consultation.
- Organized actions by organs empowered by members of a community of nations to maintain or restore peace.
- Institutionalized joint action involving the use of an armed force under the authority of an organ of a community of nations.¹³³

At present, the Rio Treaty (1947) and the Charter of the OAS (1948) include provisions that fall under the first and second categories. There are a number of initiatives that could be undertaken to strengthen these instruments. First, a resolution that reaffirms all party's commitment to the provisions of the Rio Treaty could be pursued with Particular attention being paid to Articles 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 20, and 21. These articles form the foundation for multi-lateral enforcement action. Consensual agreement could be sought to elaborate and build on Article 8 which deals with enforcement measures. In this way, non-traditional security threats could be addressed. Such an agreement could include graduated courses of action, including the use of force, to deal with all types of threats.

¹³³ Ann Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr., The Organization of American States (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), 205-6.

An additional measure that might be pursued to deal specifically with traditional security issues is a commitment not to recognize new governments installed by undemocratic means. This could help clarify the inter-American position on the principle of government recognition. It could also be helpful by sending a clear signal that, in the consensual opinion of OAS members, governments that come into being through undemocratic means demonstrate their unwillingness to abide by the general rules of international law and are therefore illegitimate.¹³⁴ Adoption of this principle might fulfill a long sought goal of the inter-American community by establishing a uniform basis for collective action in this area.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ This is the axiological approach to recognition which accepts the premise that, in addition to the mere fact of a governments existence, certain principles of behavior must be met in order for a government to be recognized. These principles are established and agreed to by States and become additional criteria for recognition. Otherwise, the rule of law can never replace power as the foundation for relations among States. For an excellent summary of the legalities of recognition and the practices of the inter-American community in this area, see Ann Thomas and A. J. Thomas Jr., The Organization of American States (Dallas, TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963), 176-87.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 182.

However, there is at least one legality that would have to be dealt with for the principle of non-recognition to be effective. Legal interpretation of Article 34 of the OAS charter supports the position that a member State has the right to be present and vote at inter-American conferences even if the government of the member state does not fulfill the legal requirements for recognition. In other words, state recognition is the criteria for participation in the OAS, not *governmental* recognition.¹³⁶

Solving this problem presents two dilemmas. At what point does an unyielding position on recognition by the OAS become a roadblock to its effectiveness as a forum for resolving problems of hemispheric security? If the OAS simply ignores and blacklists those governments considered undemocratic, how can it actively seek to influence those governments to pursue a path of political liberation and establish democratic institutions?

Part of the solution might be to amend Article 34 and establish governmental recognition by a vote of two-thirds

¹³⁶ Legally, the recognition of a state and the recognition of a government are two distinct matters. The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties establishes the inter-American requirements of statehood and international personality. These are permanent population, defined territory, government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Ibid.

majority as the criteria for bestowing OAS voting privileges on new governments. This would still allow the state the right of representation in the OAS but the right to vote would be withheld as an incentive to undertake democratic reforms.

Not all would agree that the OAS could function as the principal vehicle for cooperative security action. Some believe the role the Inter-American community in meeting future regional security challenges should be limited to supporting UN processes and relatively minor issues.¹³⁷ Bloomfield argues that attempts to reform the OAS should be avoided because it has been "tinkered" with ever since its inception.¹³⁸ However, this belief is not shared by everyone including the President of Venezuela, Carlos Andres Perez, who believes fundamental changes in attitudes and circumstances are already underway and that "fundamental reform of the OAS and [the] entire inter-American system" is feasible.¹³⁹ He goes on to point out that this reform "must foster a new understanding of the OAS's role if fulfilling

¹³⁷ The Americas in a New World, The 1990 Report of the Inter-American Dialogue (1990): 53-4.

¹³⁸ Richard Bloomfield, Alternative to Intervention (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), 134.

¹³⁹ Carlos Andres Perez, "OAS Opportunities", in Foreign Policy, No.80 (Fall, 1990): 54.

the values proclaimed in the charter".¹⁴⁰ Additionally, the 1990 Inter-American Dialogue calls for the strengthening of regional institutions to "deal effectively with the new agenda of issues in the 1990s".¹⁴¹

Given the changes in the world since 1948 and the new priorities of the 1990s, the renewal and revision of inter-American enforcement instruments could help draw a new baseline for cooperation in this area. It could also help rid the inter-American system of much of the negativeness left over from the Cold War.

On the other hand, there are those who support the assertion that the Inter-American system should become more active even in the area of security. Wayne S. Smith in a discussion of the Monroe Doctrine states his belief that U.S. leaders should do today what was intended in 1947 and 1948 and "transform the doctrine into a multi-lateral statement of intent guiding the collective security apparatus of the OAS".¹⁴² Howard Wiarda also argues for a

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ The Americas in a New World, The 1990 report of the Inter-American Dialogue (1990): 16.

¹⁴² Wayne S. Smith, "The United States and South America: Beyond the Monroe Doctrine", in Current History (February, 1991): 52.

revival of inter-American defense arrangements.¹⁴³

Progress and agreement on multi-lateral security cooperation appear key to achieving U.S. security objectives in Latin America. However, to be applicable to today's security concerns, the principle of continental self-defense seems to require re-interpretation to include non-traditional security threats and intra-regional threats in addition to more traditional security threats. From this perspective, a revision of this principle might read: *"The principle of hemispheric security cooperation and the adoption of this principle by all American republics"*.

3. Consultation between American Republics when the Peace and Well-Being of the American World is in Question

This concept was also embodied in the Rio Treaty and the OAS charter. Here again, a rejuvenated a refocused OAS may be the answer. It could serve as a valuable forum for consultations on traditional issues of security as well as the non-traditional issues of Latin debt, drug-trafficking, immigrants and refugees, weapons proliferation, and the environment. In today's international-political environment, regional governmental organizations may prove to be the best vehicles for the both consultations and the

¹⁴³ Howard J. Wiarda, "United States Strategic Policy in Latin America in the Post-Cold War Era", a paper prepared for the Symposium on Latin America to the National Defense University, Washington, D.C. (10-12 November 1990): 18-9.

channeling of multi-lateral action on such issues.

The United States seems to recognize this change in affairs. In a speech before the Council of the Americas, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said "the problems we face will not be resolved through quick promises...and easy answers. Instead, we've got to confront them together; we've got to confront them with candor; we've got to confront them with commitment; and we've got to confront them with courage".¹⁴⁴ Inherent in this statement is the need for more active diplomacy and consultation to ensure U.S. interests and concerns are integrated into the cooperative process.

To be truly effective in meeting the expectations of U.S. policy statements, inter-American diplomacy should include all issues from the total spectrum of both United States and Latin American regional interests. Candor and openness are key to the success of such a strategy. The failure of the United States to make its interests and concerns known could hinder current and future cooperative initiatives by forcing Latin American countries to second guess U.S. intentions. Well defined and clearly articulated

¹⁴⁴ "U.S. and Latin America: A Shared Destiny", an address by Secretary of State James Baker before the Council of the Americas, Washington, D.C., 1 May 1989, in Current Policy, Bulletin No. 1167 (June, 1989): 1.

U.S. objectives are essential if miscalculations and misunderstandings are to be avoided. A revitalized OAS could prove to be the most appropriate arena for this purpose.

It is possible for established international organizations such as the OAS to acquire new meaning and importance given a certain set of changed circumstances. In a study of the Inter-American system by the American Society of International Law conducted in 1979, William D. Rogers writes "...institutions, like the law itself, must be regularly tested against the contemporary interests and needs of mankind.... the question is not whether the Inter-American System is benignly good but whether it is affirmatively superior to other feasible ways of organizing the common business of the Americas".¹⁴⁵

As with the second Good Neighbor principle, the concept of inter-American consultation could be expanded beyond the scope of traditional security concerns to include non-traditional threats. It could also include the realm of regional economic cooperation. This might provide new impetus for reducing Latin America's debt burden and

¹⁴⁵ Rogers, William D., "A Note on the Future of the Inter-American System", in The Future of the Inter-American System, (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 20.

achieving the goals of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.

Based on the above discussion, a re-conceptualization of the principle of consultation seems in order. This would place more reliance on the OAS and other international organizations as vehicles for addressing the full spectrum of inter-American issues. However, no revision to the wording of this principle appears necessary.

4. The Acceptance of Pan-American Responsibilities by All Republics on Equal Terms, and the Development of a Mechanism for Carrying Out that Obligation

What separates this principle from the others is the concept of equality between the United States and Latin America in terms of their ability in dealing with regional problems. This implies a relationship of mutual dependence or pure interdependence that does not exist at this time.

Perhaps the best way to describe the U.S.-Latin American relationship today is to apply Bruce Bagley's concept of "asymmetrical interdependence".¹⁴⁶ The foundation of this concept as he applied it to U.S.-Mexican relations is the unevenness of interdependence that "undeniably confers an overall advantage on the United

¹⁴⁶ Bruce Bagley, "The Politics of Asymmetrical Interdependence: U.S.-Mexican Relations in the 1980s", in The Caribbean Challenge, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 141-3.

States".¹⁴⁷ However, this does not imply superiority.

Additionally, Bagley is quick to point out that, in the case of the United States and Mexico, growing interdependence has often increased Mexico's autonomy and constrained the United States from the use of its power.¹⁴⁸ In effect, Mexico has succeeded in limiting U.S. power by making unilateral action by the United States against Mexico damaging to its own interests.¹⁴⁹

The point is that the power relationship between the United States and other American states is asymmetrical. This reality will probably remain true for the foreseeable future.¹⁵⁰ Conceptualizing such a relationship is difficult due to its inherently dynamic nature. Georges A. Fauriol offers two possible approaches to day-to-day policy-making in the United States that he feels accounts for the "diversity and richness of the U.S-Latin American

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 142.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Abraham Lowenthal also acknowledges the asymmetrical power relationship between the U.S. and Latin America nations. However, he points out that Latin strength increased through the 1960s and 1970s relative to the U.S. to the point where, by 1980, U.S. dominance in the hemisphere had been reduced to the lowest point since World War II. Abraham Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 25.

relationship".¹⁵¹ The first is the "two tiered" approach that would require an open recognition of the distinctions U.S. policy-makers already make between its relations with Mexico and Brazil which are bilateral, and the multi-lateral relationship that exists with the rest of Latin America.¹⁵² The second is the "equatorial approach". This would build on what Fauriol considers the relatively well-defined issues and interests involved in U.S. relations with Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. These countries are located in the geographic mid-section of the hemisphere. Therefore, well developed relations with these countries could serve as an "anchor of stability" in the region.¹⁵³ Both approaches would complement the North American community concept which would be built around the economic integration of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.¹⁵⁴

These approaches seem reasonable, but there are risks involved in institutionalizing any static concept of the power relationships between the United States and the other American republics. Establishing such a mind set may limit

¹⁵¹ Georges A. Fauriol, "The Third Century: U.S.-Latin American Policy Choices for the 1990s", in CSIS Significant Issues Series (undated): 18.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

the channels available for pursuing U.S. policy initiatives. This in turn could result in unproductive and wasteful efforts. Additionally, certain policy initiatives may require unique approaches to be successful. In these cases, flexibility is a key element to policy responsiveness in keeping up with changing circumstances and the best approach may well be to determine what actions and methods are best suited to the situation at hand.

As the region's dominant and most economically stable power, the United States will likely bear an unequal share of "pan-American responsibilities" for the foreseeable future. From this perspective, it might be tempting for the United States to pursue a more unilateral course of action in determining what these responsibilities are and how they should be fulfilled. The question is whether or not this course of action would be more likely to achieve U.S. regional objectives than cooperative efforts.

The changed nature of the threats to U.S. security seem to indicate cooperative efforts have a better chance for securing the overall objectives of the United States over the long-term. At the same time, the diverse nature of U.S. interests and differences in the individual interests of other American states makes it apparent that broad collective action may not always be practical or possible. The issues of proliferation, the environment, immigrants and

refugees, and illicit drugs fall into this category.

Considering the above discussion, a re-interpretation of the fourth Good Neighbor principle seems appropriate. This re-interpretation should include the recognition of the asymmetrical power relationship that exists between American states and the impact of this asymmetry in terms of hemispheric responsibility and the ability of some nations to address certain issues. With this in mind, a revision of this principle might read: *"The acceptance of pan-American responsibilities by all republics, and the development of multi-lateral mechanisms for carrying out that obligation"*. This implies the renewal of inter-American mechanisms to make them more responsive to today's problems and concerns. It also implies the need for new inter-American mechanisms to address many of the non-traditional issues the American community now faces. This perspective accepts the fact that true interdependence does not yet exist and that different issues will impact the various members of the inter-American community with unequal force. Therefore, multi-lateral mechanisms rather than collective mechanisms may be the best vehicles for pursuing many inter-American objectives.

5. The Abolition of All Barriers and Restrictions to Trade between Nations of the Americas

The "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative" and other moves toward regional free trade are positive steps in this

direction. Additionally, a clear inter-American consensus on the direction and scope of regional free trade initiatives could also provide collective leverage during General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations and negotiations with other trade blocs. Such a consensus could also provide the President with a regional mandate to use as leverage in the U.S. Congress to gain support for regional free trade initiatives. The future of U.S.-Latin American free trade may well be determined later this year by the success or failure of the NAFTA. The battle lines are already drawn and the fight in the U.S. Congress for ratification of any agreement is expected to be bitter.¹⁵⁵

Matching this principle to today's realities might be accomplished by placing more emphasis on the need for regional economic expansion as an indispensable element of the overall objective. Free trade and regional economic expansion should be considered equally important for the

¹⁵⁵ Kiplinger believes labor unions are the biggest obstacle as low Mexican wages could undercut steel, textiles, cement, and mining in the United States. Fruit and vegetable growers are also vulnerable. Ibid. Some manufacturers and farmers fear consider the different environmental standards of the U.S. and Mexico represent an unfair competition. Thirty-seven members of Congress want such an agreement to include issues of health and labor as well as environmental factors. Clyde Farnsworth, "Environment versus Freer Trade" as reported in The New York Times (2 February, 1991): C4.

long-term success of a mutually beneficial trade relationship. This could account for the added importance of eliminating Latin debt as well as other initiatives designed to spur economic development in Latin America.

Economic expansion was an objective of the bilateral free trade agreements that were negotiated and ratified during the Good Neighbor era. However, the bilateral nature of these agreements may have been a factor in their limited success. If hemispheric free trade is the objective today, a multi-lateral approach may hold more promise for achieving this end.

An expression of this re-conceptualized principle might read: *"the abolition of all barriers and restrictions to trade between nations of the Americas and the pursuit of hemispheric economic expansion"*.

D. PAIRING REVISED GOOD NEIGHBOR PRINCIPLES TO SPECIFIC U.S. OBJECTIVES

Table 5 correlates today's broad and specific issues with revised Good Neighbor policy principles (RGNPP). These correlations suggest that U.S. regional interests could be pursued through a policy based on revised Good Neighbor principles. However, the number of correlations are an indication of the need for a comprehensive and well organized diplomatic strategy in order for such a policy to fulfill all its objectives.

It took FDR and his administration well over a decade to achieve many of the objectives of the original Good Neighbor policy. In today's more complex world, it seems reasonable to conclude that pursuing policy initiatives based on Good Neighbor principles is a long term proposition that may take decades to achieve their ultimate goals.

TABLE 5. REVISED GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY PRINCIPLES (RGNPP) PAIRED TO U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES

| ISSUES | RGNPP |
|---|---|
| Regional Economic Expansion 1) Regional Free Trade 2) Debt Reduction | 1, 3, & 5 1, 3, 4, & 5 |
| U.S. Security Concerns (Traditional) 1) Countering Nationalism 2) Securing Democracy | 1, 2, 3, & 4 1, 2, 3, & 4 |
| U.S. Security Concerns (Non-Traditional) 1) Illicit Drugs 2) Weapons Proliferation 3) Immigrants & Refugees 4) The Environment | 1, 2, 3, & 4 1, 3, & 4 1, 3, & 4 1, 3, & 4 |

In this light, are the revised Good Neighbor policy principles suggested above worth the time and effort? Do they represent the best chance for the United States to achieve its regional objectives? If not, what are the other policy options that might be pursued?

VI. CONCLUSION

Figure 1 provides five possible foundations for U.S. policy towards Latin America. They are a function of the importance of Latin America to the United States in a transitional, multi-polar world where power is shared, but the U.S. is the principal actor. This is an important point because a change in the international system alters the variables and their relative worth in achieving U.S. objectives. Additionally, the figure characterizes the type of action required at a regional level to secure U.S. security interests as Latin America's relative importance fluctuates. Table 6 provides definitions for the terms used in Figure 1. The following sections are a subjective analysis of each policy option's relative worth.

A. U.S. REGIONAL POLICY OPTIONS

1. Benign Neglect

A policy of benign neglect implies that there are no regional issues of any relevance to broad U.S. interests. If this were the case, Latin America could be removed from the mainstream of U.S. policy concerns. Benign neglect also implies that ignoring Latin America would have no negative impact on U.S. policy objectives elsewhere in the world.

**L.A.'s Importance
to U.S. Interests**

| | | | | | |
|-------------------------|---------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------|
| | : | : | : | : | : |
| | None | Somewhat | Important | Vital | Critical |
| | : | Significant | : | : | : |
| | : | : | : | : | : |
| | : | : | : | : | : |
| | : | : | : | : | : |
| Policy Options | : | : | * | : | : |
| | Benign | Pure | Cooperative | U.S. | Pre- |
| | Neglect | Pan-Am | Multi- | Hegemony | emptive |
| | : | : | Lateralism | : | Inter- |
| | : | : | : | : | ventionism |
| | : | : | : | : | : |
| | : | : | : | : | : |
| Policy Character | : | : | : | : | : |
| | Neutral | Collective | Consensual | Unilateral | Maximalist |

* Relative position of the Good Neighbor policy.

** See Table 6 for glossary of terms for Figure 1.

Figure 1. U.S. policy options for Latin America as a function of the relative importance of Latin America to U.S. national interests in a transitional, multi-polar world.

Consequently, poor U.S.-Latin relations would be an acceptable cost incurred by the lack of interaction between the U.S. and other American states.

The scenario above is not consistent with the nature of the present world environment or the goals of broad U.S. interests in the world. Benign neglect represents a regional policy option that involves a large amount of risk that important U.S. objectives will be not be realized.

TABLE 6. GLOSSARY OF TERMS FOR FIGURE 1

Benign Neglect - Neglect without malice.

Collective - marked by similarity among or with members of a group. Common action by all members of an association of nations.

Consensual - General agreement on a course of action as determined by most of those concerned.

Cooperative Multi-Lateralism - The positive and effective pursuit of policy goals agreed to by a group nations.

Critical - U.S. interests in Latin America are indispensable to overcoming a crisis that threatens the survival of the United States.

Important - U.S. interests in Latin America have a significant impact on the broad national interests of the United States.

Maximalist - Immediate and direct action is required to secure U.S. interests.

Neutral - Indifferent.

Pre-Emptive Interventionism - An extreme unilateral policy designed to overcome conditions that threaten the existence of the United States.

Pure Pan-Americanism - Perfect cooperation among the pan-American nations.

Somewhat Significant - U.S. interests in Latin America have some consequence for broader U.S. interests.

Unilateral - Policy initiatives undertaken by the United States alone.

U.S. Hegemony - A preponderant influence or authority of the United States over other regional states.

Vital - Securing U.S. interests in Latin America is essential to the continued well-being of the United States.

If pursued, this could leave U.S. policy-makers unprepared to address as yet unforeseen threats and opportunities in Latin America.

Some argue that the United States is already heading for another period of benign neglect similar to the 1970s when aid levels were reduced and the United States focused on more pressing issues elsewhere.¹⁵⁶ The reasons cited are the reduced Soviet threat, electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, new democratic regimes, a reduced Soviet involvement in Central America, and U.S. preoccupation in other parts of the world.¹⁵⁷ The counter-argument to this position holds that geographic proximity, drug trafficking, immigration and refugees, changing attitudes, and world economic trends will make it impossible for the United States to ignore Latin America.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ See Howard J. Wiarda, "United States Strategic Policy in Latin America in the Post-Cold War Era", in a paper prepared for the Symposium on Latin America at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C. (10-12 November, 1990). For a discussion of a number of alternative paths for U.S. policy in Latin America see Susan K. Purcell, "The U.S. and Regional Conflicts", in a paper prepared for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 32nd Annual Conference, Hot Springs, VA (6-9 September, 1990).

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 3-4.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 5-7.

It is clear that the United States has definite interests in Latin America that affect our national objectives. For this reason, benign neglect does not appear to be a sound policy option for the United States to pursue.

2. Pre-emptive Interventionism

The significantly reduced threat to U.S. security, the positive developments in Latin America, and U.S. goals as stated in the Bush administration's national security strategy should rule out pre-emptive interventionism as a foundation for U.S. policy, unless there is a radical reversal of the positive trends now underway. For now, securing U.S. interests in Latin America appears non-critical to the survival of the United States. Though threats to U.S. security do exist in the region, they have not escalated to the point where the very existence of the United States is threatened. This is the ultimate criterion for embarking on such policy.

3. Pure Pan-Americanism

Pure pan-Americanism implies an active and intimate relationship, perfect unity on issues of collective security, and a truly equal partnership in addressing all issues of mutual concern. Such unanimity was never achieved by the Good Neighbor policy as implemented by FDR and it probably never will be fully realized. However, this policy option is more in line with current realities than either

benign neglect or pre-emptive interventionism. Therefore, a brief summary of possible benefits and costs of this policy option seems appropriate.

The benefits of adopting a policy based on ideal pan-Americanism might include the following:

- A greatly improved image for the U.S. in the eyes of most Latin Americans.
- An improved image for the United States in the eyes of most developing countries around the world.
- A shared burden in collective security which might free resources for other programs.
- A reduced fear of U.S. dominance among Latin Americans possibly leading to closer economic ties and acceleration towards free trade.
- Greater credibility for the United States on issues of human rights.

The costs of this policy might include:

- Relinquishing the role of the United States as the dominant actor in hemispheric affairs.
- Reducing significantly the capability or inability to directly affect the outcome of regional events.
- Rejecting of the notion that traditional security concerns of the United States still pose a threat to U.S. national interests.
- Allowing Latin America to take the lead in Caribbean and Latin American collective security with no commitment on their part to use armed force as a last resort.
- Accepting the probability that the United States would be perceived by its extra-regional allies and potential adversaries as retreating from a position of strength.

The risks associated with this option are probably too great for the United States to accept at this time.

The uncertainties in the world are too many for the United States to feel comfortably secure. Additionally, the importance of the war on drugs will probably provide enough impetus on its own to keep the United States actively and directly involved in regional issues. Finally, such a policy does not take into account the asymmetries in the U.S.-Latin American relationship or the transitional nature of the international system. When and if world order is achieved, and a more balanced interdependence develops between the United States and Latin America, a policy based on ideal pan-Americanism might then be a possibility.

4. U.S. Hegemony

U.S. hegemony could be viewed as a pure application of Monroe Doctrine principles, with the Roosevelt Corollary the best historical example of this policy in action. This might also be used to characterize U.S. policy towards Central America and the Caribbean through the decade of the 1980s. The changed nature of the world would seem to indicate this policy option would not be successful in meeting changed U.S. objectives in Latin America. Nevertheless, a brief summary of the benefits and costs of adopting such a policy might be useful in placing other options in the proper perspective.

The benefits of adopting this policy could include:

- The willingness to unilaterally intervene to secure U.S. interests.
- The achievement of short-term stability through quick and direct U.S. action.
- Unquestioned dominance by the United States over regional affairs.
- The conservation of diplomatic capital for priorities elsewhere in the world.

The costs could include:

- The steady deterioration of U.S.-Latin American relations.
- The loss of U.S. credibility, stature, and influence among the developing countries of the region.
- A reversal of regional trends toward free trade.
- Alienation of the U.S. from key Latin American countries.
- The possible reversal of recent moves toward democracy in the region.

Like ideal pan-Americanism, U.S. hegemony is not likely to fulfill current U.S. policy expectations and does not fit a world where power is being diffused and the United States seems bound to pursue more cooperative policies.

5. Cooperative Multi-lateralism

Cooperative multi-lateralism could be viewed as the application of the revised principles of the Good Neighbor policy. Cooperative multi-lateralism implies a favorable and productive U.S.-Latin American relationship and consensus on issues of hemispheric concern.

Adopting this policy would require trade-offs such as the sharing of power and reliance on multi-lateral initiatives to achieve U.S. regional policy goals. It further implies primary reliance by the United States on cooperative, inter-American security mechanisms to address both traditional and non-traditional regional U.S. security concerns. This includes mutually acceptable provisions for enforcement action when necessary.

The benefits for the United States could include:

- Assistance from Latin America on U.S. security interests including the problem of drug trafficking.
- A continued leadership role for the United States on issues of mutual concern based on respect and compromise, rather than U.S. dominance.
- Cooperation and progress on regional free trade.
- The empowerment of diplomatic solutions to resolve regional problems.
- New avenues of influence to promote political liberalization in Latin America.
- Generally healthy and vigorous relations with Latin America.

The costs might include:

- The sharing of regional power with other American states.
- Primary reliance on international law, diplomacy, and consensus action to achieve U.S. regional objectives.
- A long-term commitment to pursue cooperative strategies for achieving inter-American objectives.

- An initial imbalance in economic benefits from free trade that would probably favor Latin America until balance is restored by economic growth.

The benefits appear to outweigh the risks especially in an environment where traditional challenges to U.S. security in the region have been all but eliminated. The fact that traditional security threats have dissipated may provide the extra time needed to pursue this option as long as non-traditional threats like the drug problem do not become vital to U.S. interests and derail these efforts. Additionally, cooperative multi-lateralism is consistent with the broad national interests of the United States as stated in The National Security Strategy of the United States.¹⁵⁹ It represents the middle ground between the negative realism of U.S. hegemony and the non-objective idealism of pure pan-Americanism.

Cooperative multi-lateralism could be adopted as the first step towards a more balanced hemispheric partnership, a progression that would logically parallel the progress towards stability and security in the world.

B. REGIONAL COOPERATION: A SHRINKING WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

In an effort to project U.S. strategies through the 1990s and beyond, U.S. administration policy-makers assert that

¹⁵⁹ The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States (August, 1991).

inter-dependence between nations will continue to grow. They also believe cooperative efforts are the key to global security and that U.S. policies should support these efforts.¹⁶⁰ Towards this end, U.S. strategy for this "new era" includes adherence to the following imperatives:

- "reinforcing the moral ties that hold our alliances together, even as perceptions of a common security threat change".
- "championing the principles of political and economic freedom as the surest guarantors of human progress and happiness, as well as global peace".
- "working with others in the global community to resolve regional disputes and stem the proliferation of advanced weapons".
- "reducing our defense burden as appropriate, while restructuring our forces for new challenges".
- "addressing the new global agenda of refugee flows, drug abuse, and environmental degradation."¹⁶¹

In Latin America, cooperative strategies based on revised Good Neighbor principles, as expressed through a policy of cooperative multi-lateralism, seems to fill the prescription outlined above. It also provides for both flexibility and consistency as a policy foundation for pursuing U.S. regional interests in today's uncertain international environment.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 33.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

The strategy of containment won the Cold War, but the cost in Latin America has been an intensified mistrust of the United States that has only recently begun to erode. Donald Papp characterizes perceptions as "guides to action" in international affairs and states that perceptions "form the bases of actions and policies".¹⁶²

Changing Latin America's perception of the United States and establishing a relationship of mutual trust are critical elements in achieving true regional cooperation. The consistency with which the Good Neighbor policy was implemented by FDR and his administration achieved this objective in the turmoil of the 1930s and early 1940s. In the uncertainties of the 1990s, the United States has a new opportunity to accomplish the same objective.

¹⁶² Daniel S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations: Frameworks for Understanding (New York, NY: MacMillan Publishing Co., 1988), 154-6.

APPENDIX A

LATIN AMERICAS SIGNIFICANCE TO THE UNITED STATES

The following background information is provided to amplify the discussion of current U.S.-Latin American issues in Chapter III.

A. DEMOGRAPHICS

Estimates and projections indicate that Latin America's population by the year 2000 will be 527.3 million people, approximately double that of the United States.¹⁶³ This growth will continue to be accompanied by rapid urbanization.

In 1960, there were 10 cities with a population of more than one million people in Latin America. That number grew to 25 in 1980. By the turn of the century, 48 cities are projected to have a population of one million or more and 10 of these will boast populations of more than five million.¹⁶⁴

These numbers are significant for U.S. policy in terms of

¹⁶³ The projected U.S. population is 267.9 million people. Source: CELADE-BD, 35 (1985) as quoted from table 624 of Statistical Abstract of Latin America, Vol.28 (1990): 122.

¹⁶⁴ Source: Abraham Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 9.

Latin America's potential for economic growth and the potential for increased migration to the United States as the result of economic and socio-political hardships.

B. LATIN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

As of 1990, more than 20 million persons of Hispanic-American descent lived in the United States.¹⁶⁵ This was the result of "massive and sustained" migration to the United States, primarily from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.¹⁶⁶

Migration will likely continue and Latin American immigrants will have an increasingly significant impact on U.S. society. Their impact is already being felt in many areas including education, employment, public health, business, politics, and U.S. culture.¹⁶⁷ Latino voters in California, Texas, and Florida are already affecting U.S. policy in many areas.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ Abraham Lowenthal, "Rediscovering America", Foreign Affairs (Fall, 1990): 35.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 36.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

D. LATIN AMERICA'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

Free market economics is replacing the protectionist policies of the past in Latin America. This trend parallels the ongoing democratization process in the region. Some characteristics of this new economic environment include:

- The decreasing involvement of government through de-regulation and the privatization of industry.
- New and generally favorable opportunities for foreign investors.
- Serious steps toward sub-regional economic integration in anticipation of free trade opportunities with the United States.
- The imposition of tough austerity and anti-inflation policies in many countries including Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela.¹⁶⁹

These measures, combined with effective debt reduction initiatives, could set the stage for good Latin American economic performance well into the next century.¹⁷⁰ This could prove to be very important to maintaining the United States' economic competitiveness in the future. Table 7 provides a comparison of regional market sizes world-wide.

¹⁶⁹ Sidney Weintraub, "Latin America's Economic Prospects for the 1990s", CSIS Policy Papers on the Americas, Vol.I, Report #2 (5 December 1990): 11-2.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., 12.

TABLE 7. REGIONAL MARKET SIZES

| MARKET | GNP (Billion U.S. \$) | POPULATION (Millions) |
|---------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Western Hemisphere: | 6,114 | 684 |
| European Community: | 4,720 | 365 |
| East Asia: | 2,048 | 323 |

Sources: Various (World Bank and U.S. government).¹⁷¹

¹⁷¹ Western Hemisphere includes the United States, Canada, Mexico, Central American Common Market, Caribbean Community, Andean Pact, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. The European Community includes the twelve members of the EC plus East Germany. East Asia includes Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Data are for 1989. Ibid.

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